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In our current society, governments face complex societal issues that 
cannot be tackled through traditional governance arrangements. 
Therefore, governments  increasingly come up with smart hybrid 
arrange ments that transcend the boundaries of policy domains and 
 jurisdictions, combine governance mechanisms (state, market, net-
works and self-governance), and foster new forms of collaboration. 
This book provides an overview of what smart hybridity entails and 
of its potentials and challenges. It includes empirical analyses of 
 hybrid arrangements in five policy domains, and reflections upon 
these studies by inter nationally renowned governance scholars. 
They show that the smartness of the new hybrid arrangements does 
not lie in realizing quick fixes, but in partici pants’ capacities to 
learn, adapt and arrive at sustainable and legitimate solutions that 
balance various public values.
‘Hybridity increasingly defines the governance, structure and opera-
tion of contemporary social institutions. Yet, surprisingly, there is 
 limited insight  available as to the decision-making and effectiveness 
of the various compositions that hybrid governance modes may take. 
This edited volume addresses this shortfall by way of a series 
of applied case studies that serve to unpack the various mixes of 
gover nance arrangements, their features and operating processes 
of  hybrid  arrangements across several fields. It will be particularly 
useful for those charged with designing, implementing and evaluat-
ing the ‘smarter’ hybrid governance arrangements required for our 
in creasingly complex and challenging contexts.’  Professor Robyn 
Keast, Southern Cross  University, Gold Coast, Australia. 
‘Hybridity is one of the biggest challenges for public management 
in the modern world. In this volume an outstanding collection of col-
leagues is brought together to explore the theory and practice of 
 governance in a  hybrid world. This is an important collection that 
I will return to, time and again.’ 
Professor Stephen Osborne, Uni ver si ty of  Edinburgh Business School, 
Edinburgh, United Kingdom.
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7Preface
The development of the public sector over the last couple of decades is 
often described in terms of a more or less linear shift from traditional 
public administration, via new public management, towards new 
public governance. Increasingly, governance scholars question this 
view and point to the emergence of hybrid governance. In dealing with 
the complexities of current societal problems and the high demand 
imposed on the delivery of public services, governments increasingly 
mix various gover nance modes, seeking to combine their strengths.
This volume focuses on smart hybridity, hybrid arrangements 
not intended as comprehensive reforms through a grand design but 
new, innovative and tailor-made governance practices that attempt 
to deal with complexities within an existing governance context by 
combining and bridging new and already existing instruments and 
logics. Although this may involve the intensive use of data and new 
information technologies (like social media), ‘smart’ in this context 
refers in the first place to combining various logics and modes of 
coordination. These new governance practices are smart because they 
are hybrid; hence the concept of smart hybridity. This notion implies 
ambitions to realize effective, efficient and legitimate governance 
solutions that deal with the complexities and dynamics of the current 
society. Although smart hybridity tries to bypass the drawbacks of 
existing governance modes, it is not aimed at simply realizing quick 
fixes. Rather, it aims at the realization of solutions and public services 
that are sustainable and enhance institutional trust and the resilience 
of both governance structures and society as a whole.
Despite these ambitions and promises, the concepts of both 
smartness and hybridity are weakly developed. The aim of this book 
is to explore the nature, dynamics and effects of new smart hybrid 
governance arrangements in order to increase our knowledge and 
understanding of these new ways of governing, thus contributing to 
both theory and practice. The chapters of this book report the find-
ings of five research projects on smart hybrid governance practices 
8and a collection of reflections by international governance scholars 
based on those findings. The research projects were carried out in 
the context of the ‘Smart Governance and Human Capital’ research 
programme of the Dutch Research Council (NWO) during the period 
2015-2019. We would like to thank NWO for financing the translation 
of the parts of the manuscript (Chapters 1-6) that were originally writ-
ten in Dutch. We also would like to thank the editorial board of the 
Dutch public administration journal Bestuurskunde for supporting 
this English publication that was originally published as a special 
issue of their journal (Bestuurskunde, nr 2, vol 27, summer 2018). We are 
also grateful to our publisher, Joris Bekkers, of Eleven International 
Publishing, for enthusiastically supporting the initiative to trans-
form the original text into an English manuscript on smart hybridity. 
Furthermore, we would like to thank two  anonymous reviewers for 
their critical comments on the manuscript. And, most importantly, 
we thank all the contributors to this book.
Joop Koppenjan
Philip Marcel Karré
Katrien Termeer
INTRODUCTION
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Chapter 1
New Governance 
Arrangements. 
Towards Hybrid and 
Smarter Government?
Joop Koppenjan, Philip Marcel Karré and Katrien Termeer
1.1 Introduction
In this book, we study new governance arrangements that have 
recently developed around complex issues in the public sector – new 
governance arrangements that emerge in response to the increased 
complexity, uncertainty and volatility of the issues and societal 
develop ments governments are confronted with (Tollefson, Zito, 
& Gale, 2012; Van der Wal, 2017). Societal challenges that cannot be 
tackled through traditional governance methods, that is, hierarchy, 
market, networks and societal self-governance. These challenges 
include issues such as regional economic development, urban renewal, 
social inequality, sustainability and climate change, integral youth 
care, the ageing workforce in the public services sector, economic 
growth, the development of a future-proof infrastructure and crisis 
management. These problems are commonly referred to as ‘wicked’, 
since they are resilient and hard to solve and hold a permanent position 
on political agendas (Head & Asley, 2015; Hoppe, 2010).
Wicked problems are complex not only because they are techni-
cally difficult and require specific knowledge to be dealt with but 
also because they are complex at the social level, owing to the lack of 
consensus about underlying values. That makes it difficult to gen-
erate solutions that receive widespread support. Furthermore, these 
issues are often at odds with the existing division of roles between 
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 government departments as well as between central government 
and other administrative levels (see, e.g. Lægreid & Rykkja, 2015). 
They require integral and interdisciplinary solutions, yet adminis-
trative reality is often plagued by fragmentation. Besides a lack of 
coordination and coherence, there is also a high degree of uncer-
tainty. This uncertainty stems from the fact that it is not clear how 
parties will act, from a lack of knowledge and information about 
the nature of problems and from the changeable character of the 
issues at hand and the confusion that arises during certain events, 
like policy controversies, disasters and crises (Duit & Galaz, 2008; 
Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016). However, it is also possible that parties 
do not trust the available information and knowledge or that these 
are plagued by controversy. This has to do with the high knowledge 
intensity of many of these issues. Expertise and substantive knowl-
edge are important yet ambiguous and contested (Hoppe, 2010; Weber 
& Khademian, 2008). Furthermore, the recurring nature of these 
issues stems from the fact that yesterday’s solutions often become 
today’s problems. Complex issues are never truly solved, and it is 
always possible to do better (Termeer, Dewulf, Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen, 
Vink, & van Vliet, 2016).
Moreover, the context in which these issues play out is changing 
drastically owing to the rise of social media, disruptive innovations, 
big data and populism. As the challenges that our society faces 
become greater, social cohesion and trust in traditional institutions 
are in decline. This threatens the resilience of our society as a whole 
(Chandler, 2014; Van der Wal, 2017).
1.2 Limitations of Existing Organizational and Governance 
Arrangements
Complex societal issues call for appropriate governance, yet existing 
organizational and governance arrangements are far from suitable 
for that task. Traditional public administration – characterized by 
the combination of the hierarchical, rational bureaucratic way of 
organizing and representative democracy – facilitated the rise of the 
welfare state in the twentieth century and contributed to the decline 
of poor governance and corruption. However, over time this model 
resulted in big government, inefficiencies, affordability problems and 
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 policy silos. As such, it is not compatible with the transboundary and 
horizontal nature of many policy challenges and the complex public 
services that are needed nowadays (Hughes, 2012; Koppenjan, 2012; 
Osborne, 2006). Market instruments, which were widely adopted in 
public sectors all over the world from the 1980s onwards under the 
influence of the New Public Management (NPM) philosophy, promised 
an increase in efficiency and transparency. To what extent they lived 
up to these expectations remains a matter of debate. However, they 
led to hyperfragmentation, dominance of efficiency considerations 
over other public values, and opportunistic behaviour and alienation 
among public professionals and clients. Furthermore, they often fail 
to offer the coherence, innovation, public values and involvement 
that new challenges require (Hood, 1991; Hood & Dixon, 2015; Pollitt & 
Bouckaert, 2004). A shift towards what has been labelled as New Public 
Governance (NPG) has been taking place in recent decades, as is evident 
from the rise of network governance and various forms of collaborative 
governance. Although network governance facilitates collaboration 
and horizontal administration, this way of governing also has its 
risks and drawbacks. It may result in problems such as exclusion, 
limited transparency and high transaction costs. The expectation 
that citizens and social organizations will take action to overcome 
new challenges is often curbed by the limitations of societal self- 
governance (Ansell & Gash, 2007; O’Flynn, 2007; Osborne, 2006; Pierre, 
2000; Sørenson & Triantafillou, 2013; Teisman, van Buuren & Gerrits, 
2009; Torfing & Triantafillou, 2013). Table 1 provides an overview of 
the strong and weak points of each of the aforementioned modes of 
governance (compare Koppenjan, 2012; Nederhand, Klijn, Van der Steen 
& Van Twist, 2019).
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Table 1 Governance models and their strengths and weaknesses
Traditional 
Public 
Adminis­
tration
New Public 
Management
New Public 
Governance: 
 Collaborative 
Network 
 Governance
New Public 
 Governance: 
Societal 
Self­Steering 
and Self­ 
Governance
Strengths Effective 
provision of 
public goods 
and services; 
good govern-
ance
Performance, 
efficiency, 
transparency
Integrative 
policies and 
services; public 
values 
Tailor-made 
solutions 
and services; 
 community 
and citizen 
empower ment
Weak-
nesses
Inefficient; 
fragmented; 
no tailor- made 
solutions; 
no innovation
Hyperfrag-
mentation, 
perverse incen-
tives; cultural 
confusion 
High trans-
action cost; lack 
of transparency; 
limits of volun-
tary agreements
Inequality; 
overestimation 
of informal 
networks; lack 
of continuity
1.3 New Governance Arrangements: Hybrid and Smart
Traditional governance arrangements, hierarchy, markets, networks 
and societal self-steering alike are ill-suited to deal with complex 
societal issues on their own. At the same time, various parties, 
governments, businesses, societal organizations and citizens are 
experimenting with a wide range of new, smart and hybrid forms 
of governance in order to overcome the shortcomings of traditional 
gover nance regimes. Examples range from citizen initiatives and 
Internet platforms to cross-government coalitions, non-rule-based 
forms of behavioural influencing (nudging), relational governance 
and private self-governance and branding. They may involve  emergent 
forms of governance, such as the ‘Takecarebnb’s’, in which Amsterdam 
citizens sheltered refugees as they waited to be assigned a house by the 
government after receiving a residence permit (Boersma, Kraiukhina, 
Larruina, Lehota, & Nury, 2018), or initiatives by social entrepreneurs 
aimed at labour market integration of low-skilled individuals (Karré, 
2018). They may also involve new ways of working imposed by the 
government, such as care provided by family members, replacing 
formal care arrangements, or private- public partnerships,  replacing 
 traditional procurement of public infrastructure (Griffith, 2000; 
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Koppenjan & de Jong, 2018; Nederhand, Bekkers, & Voorberg, 2016; 
Tollefson et al., 2012).
In this book we examine various examples of such new governance 
arrangements. We show that their success lies in their hybrid-
ity, which makes them a smart way to deal with society’s wicked 
problems. They are hybrid because they transcend the borders of 
traditional sectors (state, market, networks and society), policy 
do mains and jurisdictional levels. They combine different and in her-
ently contradictory governance mechanisms (state, market networks 
and self-organisation) in new and innovative ways and foster co- 
production between different societal actors. They are smart in the 
sense that they rarely involve the introduction of fundamentally new 
organizational structures and methods or costly, large-scale reforms. 
Instead, they involve modifications of existing organizational and 
governance arrangements, the introduction of innovations on a small 
scale, or the intelligent combination of existing methods through 
‘bricolage’ (Fulgsang, 2010; Lowdness & Roberts, 2013; Streeck & 
Thelen, 2005). These new forms of organization and governance rely 
on informal mechanisms and ‘softer’ governance methods and man-
age to bridge the gaps between individuals, organizations, domains 
and administrative levels in today’s hyperfragmented organizational, 
economic, political and social environment (Koppenjan, 2012).
Hybrids are, of course, not a new or uncommon phenomenon. 
Yet hybridity has so far been studied mainly at the organizational 
level. The concept has already been applied during the 1980s and 1990s 
(Bardach & Eccles, 1991; Eccles, 1981; Lowndes & Skelcher, 1998; Offe, 
1996; Rhodes, 1997; Williamson, 1991). Since the beginning of the 
new millennium, we have seen a new wave of studies on hybridity 
owing to the increased mixing of governance modes described earlier 
(e.g. Battilana & Lee, 2014; Brandsen & Karré, 2011; Denis, Ferlie, & van 
Gestel, 2015; Powell, Gillett, & Doherty, 2019; Smith, 2014). Authors see 
an increasing number of hybrid organizations, straddling the borders 
between state, market and civil society, each with its unique set of 
norms, values and institutional logics (Anheier & Krlev, 2015; Billis, 
2010; Karré, 2011; Powell et al., 2019; Schmitz & Glänzel, 2016; Smith, 
2014; Tenbensel, 2017).
16
Hybridity, of course, also develops in networks where parties from 
different sectors and domains meet, for example in public-private 
partnerships. And in view of the transition from the welfare state 
to public service provision by a network of various parties (public, 
private and civil society), the whole system of public service delivery 
is now understood to have become not only more complex but more 
hybrid as well (Christensen & Lægreid, 2010; Emery & Giauque, 2014; 
Johanson & Vakkuri, 2017). However, how hybridity functions at the 
interorganizational and system level and what implications hybridity 
has for governance remain understudied.
The new and smart governance arrangements described in this 
volume are hybrid since they have a horizontal nature but do not pre-
clude the presence of hierarchy or markets. They combine different 
governance methods and are often embedded in more comprehen-
sive institutional practices (compare Tollefson et al., 2012). They 
are not limited to local administration either, despite the often- 
prominent role played by local actors and citizens (compare Barber, 
2013). Rather, they can be found at various levels of government and 
often include forms of multilevel governance in the sense that they 
are being influenced by actors, policies and institutions at the local, 
regional, national and inter national levels (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016; 
Peters & Pierre, 2001).
Among other things, this means that hybrid, and thus smart 
governance involves bringing the right parties together at the right 
moment and stimulating their collective problem-solving capability 
as well as finding new governance arrangements in the space that 
exists between government, market and society. These are often 
hybrid forms of governance based on smart combinations of existing 
organizational and governance methods.
Howlett and Rayner (2006), for example, identify instances of 
policy instruments and programmes stacked on top of each other in 
a process of policy layering “that requires ‘smart’ or ‘co-ordinated’ 
governance arrangements”. Smart governance in this sense is not 
so much about the use of information technology and big data, as is 
the case, for instance, in accounts on ‘smart cities’. Rather, it is about 
coordinating various forms of governance, arriving at intelligent 
hybrid combinations of policy instruments and governance models 
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(see also Bolívar & Meijer, 2016; Gunningham, Grabosky, & Sinclair, 
1998; Willke, 2007).
Ideally, these new hybrid governance arrangements combine the 
strengths of each governance mode and compensate or mitigate its 
weaknesses. However, given their fundamentally different nature, 
hybrid arrangements will always create tensions. These tensions 
can be made productive when they create synergies and lead to 
innovation, but they can also become destructive and therefore 
counter productive (Anheier & Krlev, 2015; Battilana & Lee, 2014; 
Brandsen & Karré, 2011; Christensen & Lægreid, 2010; Howlett & 
Rayner, 2006; Jacobs, 1992; Karré, 2011; Mair et al., 2015). The question, 
therefore, is not whether hybridity in governance arrangements is 
a smart idea (that ship has sailed, one might say) but rather how we 
can deal with its effects and therefore create a situation that could be 
described as smart hybridity. We do this in this volume by looking at 
how these new hybrid arrangements work in practice. By doing so, 
we counter the criticism (e.g. Billis, 2010; Denis et al., 2015; Skelcher & 
Smith, 2014) that hybridity is often used in public administration or 
management research only as a descriptive or umbrella term, with-
out paying attention to questions concerning its specific nature and 
effects and how it can be managed in a smart way and used as a smart 
form of governance.
These questions have to be raised as the new hybrid arrangements 
described in this volume are expected to result in adequate and smart 
ways to deal with actual complex societal challenges. Nevertheless, 
some scepticism regarding the use of these new governance arrange-
ments to deal with complex societal problems is justified. After all, 
they address major challenges and involve lofty ambitions, while at 
the same time they often do not entail large-scale reforms or radically 
different forms of organization and management. On the other hand, 
can smart governance be seen as a breeding ground for new organ-
izational and governance arrangements? Fundamental reforms or 
radical interventions do not necessarily bring about transformative 
changes; one need only look at the effectiveness of the attempted 
regime change in Iraq or the aftermath of the Arab spring, in the 
Arab world, to understand that. Instead, transformative changes are 
often the result of gradual and incremental changes and the effects 
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of learning processes over a longer period. They tend to start small 
and gain salience through gradual broadening, upscaling and main-
streaming (see, e.g. Elzen, Geels, & Green, 2003; Lowndes & Roberts, 
2013; Termeer, Dewulf, & Biesbroek, 2017).
The observation that governments increasingly use smart and 
hybrid governance arrangements to respond to complex problems 
raises the question of the extent to which these new forms of gover-
nance live up to expectations. Can they indeed adequately tackle 
today’s societal challenges, resulting in effective, innovative and 
legitimate solutions and public services that contribute to society’s 
resiliency and the restoration of people’s trust in policies and public 
institutions?
1.4 The Research Questions Addressed in This Book
This book focuses on examining various examples of smart hybridity 
in practice, with the aim of addressing the complex challenges that 
today’s society and public sector face. In particular, answers are sought 
to the following questions:
1. What is the nature of new hybrid governance arrangements, 
and what characteristics do they share?
2. What assumptions and mechanisms form the foundation of these 
new hybrid governance methods, and how have they manifested 
themselves in practice?
3. In what way do the new hybrid governance arrangements contrib-
ute to solving complex challenges in terms of effectiveness, inno-
vation and application of knowledge, legitimacy and resilience; to 
what extent are they smart?
The book consists of two parts. The first part presents the findings 
of five research projects on governance practices in which new, 
smart and hybrid governance arrangements are applied. These 
contributions are based on research projects conducted as part of a 
multi-year research programme in new, smart governance arrange-
ments funded by the Dutch Research Council (NWO). Although this 
research was conducted in a Dutch context, it was characterized by 
an inter national orientation. The contribution on the certification 
of trade and production chains (Chapter 6), for instance, examines 
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inter national governance practices. In some contributions, experi-
ences from different countries are compared. The study of platform 
governance during crisis situations (Chapter 2) compares experi-
ences from the Netherlands and Nepal, and Chapter 5, on regional 
gover nance, compares cases from four European countries. In the 
other contributions on public-private partnerships (Chapter 3) and 
the decentralization in the social care domain (Chapter 4), Dutch 
experiences are placed in an international perspective. In the choice 
of those governance practices and policy areas, the primary concern 
was not generalizability but rather the availability of expertise and 
data, and the quality of the research. However, it can be said that the 
case  studies presented in the various contributions combine to create 
a rich overview of the variety of the playing field and the diversity 
of the new, hybrid and smart governance arrangements with which 
govern ments attempt to address today’s complex societal challenges.
The first contribution (Chapter 2), by Boersma, Ferguson, 
Groenewegen, Mulder, Schmidt and Wolbers, investigates the collab-
oration between emergency services and citizens during crisis 
situations and disasters in and around Internet platforms. This con-
tribution inquires into the role that online platforms play in smartly 
guiding the self-organization of citizens during crises and disasters. 
Social media and online platforms have increased the possibilities for 
self-organization through improved connectivity. In crisis situations, 
governments struggle to combine this form of self-organization with 
the work of professional emergency services and their own coordi-
nating role. This raises the question of whether and how citizens’ 
initiatives and crises management by government can be combined. 
The contribution discusses two cases in more depth: the role of online 
platforms in the aftermath of the earthquakes in Nepal in 2015 and 
the coordination of the reception of refugees during the crisis in the 
Netherlands in the winter of 2015-2016.
Koppenjan, Klijn, Warsen and Nederhand discuss in Chapter 3 the 
attempts to arrive at smart governance modes in managing hybrid 
public-private partnerships (PPPs), more specifically public infra-
structure projects governed by design, build, finance, maintain 
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and operate (DBFMO) contracts. In doing so the Dutch government 
was strongly inspired by the UK Private Finance initiative. The idea 
behind these partnerships is that by bundling public and private 
resources, the increasing complexity of today’s public infrastructure 
projects can be tackled more easily. However, governing these hybrid 
arrangements proves to be difficult. As a consequence of several 
problems in managing these projects in the Netherlands, the parties 
involved now seek new, smart ways of governing these partnerships. 
The contribution discusses the potentials and difficulties of the pro-
posed shift from the current dominant financial economic-oriented 
contractual approach to PPP towards a more socio logically inspired 
relational form of governance that better fits the complexities that 
characterize these projects.
In Chapter 4 De Roo and Jagtenberg discuss hybridity related to the 
attempts of the Dutch government to activate the role of networks of 
clients in the social care domain. The Dutch social care system was 
fundamentally reformed in 2015. A key policy aim was to activate cit-
izens and their social networks, turning them from mere consumers 
into co-producers of care. The contribution describes how Family 
Group Conferences and Neighbourhood Teams emerged and function. 
In these practices, different mixes between clinical and self-govern-
ance emerge. It appears difficult to attain an optimal balance between 
both owing to low trust between professionals and clients’ networks, 
a lack of resources and unawareness of the client’s rights. This con-
tribution investigates how the hybridity that evolves as a result of 
the introduction of this new governance arrangement impacts on the 
effectiveness and legitimacy of this attempt at the smart governance 
of the social domain.
In Chapter 5 Schaap, Colombo, Damen and Karsten discuss new 
forms of regional governance in metropolitan areas in four European 
regions that have a hybrid nature, in the sense that they have private 
and public characteristics. With these arrangements, municipalities 
in the city regions of Berlin, Eindhoven, Copenhagen, Malmö and 
Zürich aim to increase their regional problem-solving capacity and to 
govern smartly in a complex and multilevel context. The contribution 
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investigates how the hybrid modes of governance impact on both 
effectiveness and legitimacy, and to what extent and under what con-
ditions hybridity and smartness go hand in hand.
In Chapter 6 Termeer, Toonen, Kok and Turnhout present their 
research on private certification systems for improving the 
sustain ability of global production and trade chains. Traditional 
state-centred governance systems have failed to effectively tackle 
the trans national problem concerning the sustainability of these 
global value chains (GVCs). To fill this ‘institutional void’, industry 
and non-govern mental organizations (NGOs) established a series 
of global partnerships that designed standards and certification 
schemes for global commodities. This contribution investigates the 
extent to which these new arrangements can be evaluated as smart 
and hybrid and the approach to managing challenges that arise in 
governing these arrangements.
Table 2 gives an overview of the empirical studies as presented in 
 chapters 2-6.
The second part of the book engages with the reflections of inter-
nationally renowned scholars, who have published on complexity, 
governance and hybridity. In their contributions, they reflect on the 
chapters in the first part of the book and share ideas about the the-
oretical approaches of hybridity and smartness of governance and 
the methodological and practical implications. They highlight the 
strengths of the concept of smart hybridity as also its limitations 
and risks. In doing so, they lay out the future research agenda on the 
nature of new governance arrangements and the conditions under 
which their limitations and risks can be overcome. They thus sketch 
a way forward for new governance arrangements that are both hybrid 
and smart.
In the concluding chapter of the book we compare the five contribu-
tions on new, hybrid and smart governance arrangements from Part 
one, their nature and the mechanisms that underlie their function-
ing. We evaluate both their potentials and strengths and the problems 
and dilemmas public managers and other stakeholders are confronted 
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with in applying smart hybridity in governance arrangements. We 
discuss the requirements they impose on the governance capacity 
and skills of those intending to embrace smart hybridity as gov-
ernance hybridity and the wider implications for governments and 
societies that try do deal with wicked problems and realize complex, 
high-quality public services. In doing so we reflect on several of the 
issues brought forward by our international colleagues. We incorpo-
rate them into our narrative on smart hybrid governance and discuss 
where research and practice could and should go from here.
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Chapter 2 
Platform Governance of 
Self-Organized Initiatives in 
Response to Disasters
Kees Boersma, Julie Ferguson, Peter Groenewegen, Femke Mulder, 
Arjen Schmidt and Jeroen Wolbers
In times of crises or disaster, the response capacity of public author-
ities is put under extreme pressure. In contrast, citizens are resilient 
in times of crises and are increasingly organizing themselves. 
The new possibilities offered by social media and online platforms 
have the potential for citizen self-organization. In practice, we see 
that governments struggle to deal properly with this type of self- 
organization, even though it offers a unique opportunity to boost 
responsiveness. Governments that succeed in making use of citizen 
initiatives can gain access to new opportunities and increase their 
effectiveness. This chapter addresses the following question: What 
role do online platforms play in the governance of self-organized 
citizen initiatives in response to crises and disasters? We will answer 
this question by considering two examples: the role played by online 
platforms in the aftermath of the 2015 earthquakes in Nepal and the 
coordination of the Dutch refugee crisis in the winter of 2015-2016.
2.1 Citizen Initiatives in Times of Crises and Disaster
In times of crises or disaster, the response capacity of the government 
is put under extreme pressure. It is the role of the government to mit-
igate the effects of the disaster and to protect its citizens as effectively 
as possible. This is a difficult task, as the aftermath of a disaster is 
often chaotic and characterized by complexity and uncertainty. Media 
emphasize the negative effects such as panic and looting, which rarely 
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occur in practice. In order to make an adequate response in the after-
math of a disaster, a government will first attempt to gain control over 
the situation (Tierney, 2014). The response to crisis situations is there-
fore often characterized by a top-down approach, consisting of actions 
aimed at maintaining public safety and order.
It is obvious that the government should focus on the disorder that 
a disaster leaves in its wake, as protecting its citizens is a key govern-
ment task. However, research into disasters and crises has shown that 
the notion of social disorder and unrest is rather one-sided. It turns 
out that panic and undesirable behaviour in response to a disaster are 
the exception rather than the rule. In fact, citizens – not government 
agencies – are the first to arrive at the site of the disaster or crisis to 
provide assistance (Helsloot & Ruitenberg, 2004). In the aftermath 
of disasters, citizens tend to act altruistically and assist each other 
spontaneously. Disasters connect those affected and often inject the 
community with a sense of togetherness (Solnit, 2010). After the 9/11 
attacks in New York, for instance, citizens organized a large-scale 
evacuation over water (Kendra & Wachtendorf, 2016). In the after-
math of Australia’s Queensland floods, traffic jams were surprisingly 
found leading into town rather than out of town. Citizens flocked to 
the city as one to help clear the rubble and mud (Bunce, Partridge & 
Davis, 2012). In the Netherlands, we have also seen citizens organize 
spontaneous initiatives in response to a crisis situation. The influx 
of refugees into the Netherlands in the winter of 2015-2016 led to 
significant unrest and uncertainty. The government agency respon-
sible for housing refugees, the Central Agency for the Reception of 
Asylum Seekers (Centraal Orgaan opvang Asielzoekers, COA), in par-
ticular, did not have sufficient capacity and flexibility at its disposal 
to respond adequately to the incoming refugees (Smets, Younes, 
Dohmen, Boersma & Brouwer, 2017). Local citizen initiatives in large 
cities such as Amsterdam played an important role by offering small-
scale accommodation to status holders in the community (Boersma, 
Kraiukhina, Larruina, Lehota & Nury, 2019).
Attention to civil initiatives in response to disasters is not a new 
phenomenon. It has been well known and documented since the 
1960s that citizens are able to organize themselves in response to a 
disaster (Dynes, 1994). What is new, however, is the wide range of 
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 opportunities for the application of new governance mechanisms 
thanks to the emergence of new communication technology, such as 
social media and Web 2.0 platforms like Facebook and Twitter 
(Meijer, 2011; Slot, Cuppen, Doorn, Galeano Galvan & Klievink, 2017). 
Such online platforms allow interested parties to make contact with 
others, share information and organize themselves. In the after-
math of a disaster or crisis, citizens use these platforms to mobilize, 
exchange information and connect with various initiatives (Albris, 
2018). After the attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015, for instance, 
it took citizens only half an hour to organize an ad hoc emer-
gency initia tive by using Twitter to offer shelter with the hashtag 
#PorteOuverte (open door) (Ross, 2015).
The advantage of online platforms is that they are a relatively 
accessible way to channel citizen initiatives in response to disasters 
and crises. Various studies have shown that the scale of community 
assistance and support in the aftermath of crises is enormous but 
that many types of community assistance are temporary and difficult 
to map, which means that they are often poorly aligned (Whittaker, 
McLennan, & Handmer, 2015). Platform governance can be a way to 
attune the multitude of initiatives to the formal government response 
and to each other.
In recent years, a great deal of attention has been paid to forms 
of self-organization and co-production in public administration 
research. These types of governance, regardless of whether they 
involve online platforms or not, involve the cooperation of govern-
ment agencies with relevant stakeholders, including citizen 
initiatives (Voorberg, Bekkers & Tummers, 2015). Ownership and 
involvement have an important role to play here, as do questions of 
legitimacy and reliability. In addition, governments have to deal with 
limited capacity in their attempts to respond adequately to emer-
gencies. The need for governance and help in directing a response 
persists because the outcomes of citizen initiatives and co-production 
are uncertain. During and after a crisis, self- organization is made 
even more complicated because of the major role played by time pres-
sure. Moreover, since crisis situations are un expected, the relevant 
stakeholders are difficult to identify. In other words, crises and their 
consequences in society are a challenge for current governance struc-
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tures and even for the most innovative structures that are currently 
being developed. This chapter examines the nature and potential of 
platform governance during crises and disasters: tapping into and 
directing the organizational capacity of decentralized (online) initia-
tives (Janssen & Estevez, 2013). The develop ment of new technologies 
and communication facilities is partly responsible for changing the 
nature and structure of the relation ships between stakeholders from 
homogeneous to diverse and from static to dynamic. New, ad hoc, 
flexible forms of organization have become realistic alternatives to 
traditional hierarchical structures in emergency aid.
2.2 Approach
Governments typically struggle to incorporate Web 2.0 initiatives 
into existing systems of governance (Meijer, Koops, Pieterson & Tije, 
2012). In face of a hectic crisis situation, governments are often fairly 
internally focused at first. Their first concern is to mobilize people and 
resources, which takes time. The extent of a particular crisis is often 
unknown in the initial stages, as are the measures that need to be taken 
to manage the threat. In addition, the consequences of many crises 
manifest themselves in different jurisdictions and at different levels of 
government. Questions such as who is responsible for what, what man-
date the various stakeholders have and who has ownership over what 
play a key role in the first phase of a crisis.
By the time these questions are resolved, citizens will usually 
have already started helping themselves and others. In the case of 
crisis management, the challenge posed to governance does not 
involve control as much as learning to trust the capabilities of citizen 
initiatives set up spontaneously by citizens in response to a crisis 
(Boersma, Ferguson, Groenewegen & Wolbers, 2014). Following on 
from our study1 on citizen initiatives and the role played by online 
platforms in response to crises and disasters, this chapter will 
address the following question: What role do online platforms play 
1 The study, conducted in Nepal and the Netherlands, is part of the NWO 
‘Smart Disaster Governance’ project, which focuses on how emergency 
 services  cooperate with each other and with citizens during crisis situations 
and disasters in a Dutch and an international humanitarian context.
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in the governance of self-organized citizen initiatives in response to 
crises and disasters? To answer this question, we first collected data 
pertaining to the emergence of online platforms used in international 
humanitarian relief efforts, focusing on the relief efforts following 
the earthquakes in Nepal in 2015. Second, we studied the role played 
by an online platform in the Netherlands in the winter of 2015-2016, 
when the influx of refugees resulted in a crisis situation. In both 
cases, we spoke to key informants, initiative organizers, government 
officials and volunteers (Mulder, Ferguson, Groenewegen, Boersma & 
Wolbers, 2016; Wolbers, Ferguson, Groenewegen, Mulder & Boersma, 
2016; Schmidt, Wolbers, Ferguson & Boersma, 2017). We combined our 
interviews with the impressions resulting from our fieldwork and 
also studied the stakeholders and their networks.
2.3 Online Platforms
First of all, our study in Nepal and the Netherlands confirms the notion 
that citizens generally play a positive role as volunteers in the response 
to disasters and crises. Both in Nepal and in the Netherlands, citizens 
showed themselves able to mobilize, set up initiatives and develop new 
forms of organizing. It also became apparent that government agencies 
struggled to connect with these spontaneous community initiatives. 
The government agencies responsible for disaster management are set 
up and organized according to a formal, bureaucratic structure, where 
legitimacy and accountability play a major role. By contrast, the plat-
form-based initiatives carried out by citizens were, generally speaking, 
organized spontaneously, without any formal rules or clearly deline-
ated responsibilities.
In Nepal, one platform played a particularly influential role: 
QuakeMap (Mulder et al., 2016). This platform drew its inspira-
tion from one of the most appealing forms of platform governance 
emerging in the wake of the earthquake in Haiti in 2010. A group of 
Harvard computer scientists used OpenStreetMaps to develop online 
maps immediately after the disaster to map the affected area and the 
requests for assistance and aid (Mulder et al., 2016). Four days after 
the earthquake in Haiti, volunteers set up a free phone line (4636) 
that people could use to send text messages with information about 
the disaster. Mission 4636 then used crowdsourcing to verify and plot 
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this information, leading to one of the most up-to-date maps availa-
ble of the disaster area (Zook, Graham, Shelton & Gorman, 2010).
This technique, known as ‘crisis mapping’, became popular around 
the world and was an important tool for relief workers in Nepal as well 
(Streep, 2015). In the days that the Nepalese government struggled 
with serious capacity issues and was fully occupied with organiz-
ing its own response to the crisis, volunteers in Nepal worked with 
Kathmandu Living Labs, a non-profit organization, to collect and 
share information about the disaster. This system built on initiatives 
such as OpenStreetMaps and Open Cities Kathmandu, which were 
developed with the support of the World Bank in Washington D.C. In 
addition to mapping geographical data, the initiators of Open Cities 
Kathmandu organized mapping workshops for students and youth 
groups. Kathmandu Living Labs proved to be a highly appealing initi-
ative for the local, mainly highly educated volunteers who were active 
in the first few weeks after the earthquakes in Nepal.
The maps developed by Kathmandu Living Labs had the primary 
function of supporting relief efforts for those affected by the disaster 
in the first few days and weeks, when virtually no information was 
available and very little was known about the extent and nature of the 
damage, the number of victims and the need for emergency aid and 
assistance. The volunteers working with Kathmandu Living Labs then 
linked the local demand for aid in the affected area to the local supply 
of aid by mobilizing truck drivers who could transport relief supplies. 
The maps created by these community initiatives proved to be so val-
uable in the months after the disaster that the authorities ultimately 
also began using the information for logistical purposes, among 
other things. These included the Nepalese army, as well as interna-
tional humanitarian organizations and the United Nations. Crisis 
mapping therefore supported the coordination and cooperation effort 
between those affected by the earthquakes and the communities who 
rushed in to help, proving that community initiatives allow govern-
ments to enter into new coalitions to help manage crisis situations.
The Netherlands too is witnessing a rising trend of citizen ini-
tiatives organized in the wake of disasters by means of online 
platforms. During our study, we saw how the Dutch Red Cross 
set up its own project, Ready2Help, to experiment with an online 
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pool of citizen volunteers who could be called on to assist in a dis-
aster or crisis (Schmidt et al., 2017). Volunteers could register via 
the Ready2Help platform, allowing the Red Cross to mobilize them 
with a text  message and use them to carry out support activities, 
such as reinforcing dykes or providing logistical assistance to reduce 
the burden placed on formal disaster management organizations. 
The Ready2Help platform acts as an intermediary between sponta-
neous volunteers and established aid organizations, thus enhancing 
the effectiveness of citizen initiatives and providing an important 
new governance mechanism to organize citizen relief efforts. The 
usefulness of this type of platform governance was demonstrated 
during the refugee crisis (Boersma et al., 2019). After some hesitation, 
the Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers ultimately 
accepted the help of the Ready2Helpers to set up new accommo-
dations for the refugees. The Red Cross played an important role, 
mediating between the govern ment and volunteering citizens. 
In addition, the initiative allowed the Red Cross to gain experience 
with new types of volunteering.
2.4 New Governance Possibilities: Opportunities and 
Dilemmas
Platforms are an important new tool to help organize civil relief 
efforts and serve as a new way to mobilize citizens. Our research 
mainly demonstrated that platforms give authorities the opportunity 
to try out and implement new organizational principles. The forms 
of collaboration do not take the shape of permanent (government) 
organizations but concern temporary arrangements, without strong 
hierarchical structures, combining features of network and classi-
cal organization (Chisholm, 1992; Christensen, Andreas Danielsen, 
Laegreid & Rykkja, 2016).
The diversity of the initiatives and their varying levels of organiza-
tion offer opportunities, but also raise new questions. The literature 
shows that professional relief workers are by no means always open 
to citizen help (Barsky, Trainor, Torres, & Aguirre, 2007). On the one 
hand, relief workers see how citizen aid can be useful, especially if 
they are not capable of deploying sufficient people and resources 
themselves. On the other hand, they are also distrustful of civil 
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initia tives and often fear that citizen volunteers will endanger them-
selves and others (Twigg & Mosel, 2017).
The initiatives organized by online platforms derive their legiti-
macy from the specific, local knowledge of the people involved, but 
they are also faced with the question of for whose sake and on whose 
behalf they carry out activities and take decisions. In the wake of the 
earthquakes in Nepal, for instance, it became clear that neither the 
international aid organizations nor the spontaneous initiatives such 
as Kathmandu Living Labs were capable of reaching the most vulner-
able victims in the remotest affected areas (Mulder & Boersma, 2017). 
While the Ready2Help platform managed to mobilize a large number 
of volunteers in a short amount of time, the Red Cross has not yet suc-
ceeded in putting the expertise of the volunteers in its pool to optimal 
use (Schmidt et al., 2017). We found that the Red Cross primarily used 
citizens for generic tasks such as setting up beds and selected for the 
temporary use of specific skills and expertise, such as medical exper-
tise or language skills.
The question in which specific situations and under what con-
ditions authorities can optimize citizen aid remains unanswered 
(Nohrstedt, Bynander, Parker, & ’t Hart, 2018). Citizen initiatives 
emerge ‘spontaneously’ and ‘ad hoc’, usually in response to the idea 
that the government is not yet providing sufficient aid. This also 
means that new initiatives will arise in unexpected places. When pre-
paring for new crisis situations, it is difficult for professional 
emergency services to set up new structures that will be suitable 
for a wide range of potential types of online or offline citizen input. 
A first practical step may be to invest in the ability of emergency 
 service workers to recognize new citizen initiatives and to take a 
 flexible, creative approach to dealing with citizen aid.
2.5 Conclusion
To date, governments are still looking for new resources and measures 
to optimize the societal governance model. The reflex reaction to the 
chaos caused by a disaster or crisis is trying to gain control over the 
emergency service response. Both in the Netherlands and in other 
countries, however, government agencies have started to see that they 
must apply new ways of governing in response to a disaster or crisis 
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in order to optimize the responsiveness of spontaneous community 
initiatives and to increase the legitimacy of their own efforts. Citizens 
are becoming increasingly adept at using online platforms to orga-
nize themselves in the aftermath of disasters and crises, which offer 
communities the capacity to organize themselves outside of formal 
governmental frameworks. By virtue of the power of these spontaneous 
initiatives, the government is forced to take community initiatives 
in response to disasters seriously, especially since the crisis situation 
in question puts their own efforts under extreme pressure. Utilizing 
and activating civil initiatives during crisis situations is a challenge to 
govern ments since these activities are not compatible with their for-
mal, hierarchical internal organization structures.
As such, developing the government’s ability to engage in platform 
governance is a considerable challenge. In the examples mentioned 
earlier, we can identify a continuum of governance arrangements 
stretching from the development of an entirely new structure to 
engage citizens in self-organization to the use of a coordination plat-
form. Platform management is a new form of governance that boosts 
the government’s adaptive capacity by facilitating the connection 
with spontaneous civil initiatives. This involves, on the one hand, 
making use of the strengths of the initiatives that arise in society 
(effectiveness) and, on the other hand, retaining the responsiveness 
of the government (legitimacy). When coordinating relief efforts, the 
government should not seek to control and regulate local initiatives 
but to facilitate and align with them.
The cases described earlier show that governments can make use of 
the innovative capacity of their citizens during crisis situations and 
in the aftermath of such situations as well. On the one hand, recog-
nizing and connecting with relevant civil initiatives on time can be 
a challenge to governments, which requires a smart approach in the 
wake of a disaster or crisis and forces them to enhance their adaptive 
capacity. Relief organizations, including those of government, will 
have to redesign their internal organization structure in such a way 
that they are able to make optimum use of Internet platforms. On the 
other hand, governments can provide additional direction when 
equality and accessibility of aid for all those affected turn out to be 
problem atic. The platforms, and the parties that operate on them, 
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give govern ments new opportunities that revolve around their con-
necting role: supporting new and smart governance methods to make 
optimal use of community resilience.
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Chapter 3 
Towards New Ways of 
Governing Public-Private 
Partnerships in Public 
Infrastructure
Joop Koppenjan, Erik Hans Klijn, Rianne Warsen and José Nederhand*1
Public-private partnerships play a key role in the construction and 
management of public infrastructure all over the world, with many 
countries following the UK’s example by using Design, Build, 
Finance, Maintenance and Operation (DBFMO) contracts: long-term 
contracts that fully outsource the various project phases to a pri-
vate consortium. These smart DBFM(O) contracts strive to combine 
the strengths of government and the market in order to cope with 
increasingly large and complex public projects. In practice, how-
ever, things are more complicated, with partnerships sometimes 
resulting in failures and disputes. Recently, a number of public 
and private  parties in the Netherlands have taken the initiative to 
develop what they called ‘a new market vision’, with new ideas on how 
public- private partnerships should be implemented and governed. 
According to this new vision, relational aspects of partnerships 
and cooperation, such as attitude, openness, trust and relationship 
* Acknowlegdements: This contribution was written in the context of the 
research project ‘Governance for Smartening Public-Private Partnerships’ 
funded by the NWO (The Dutch Research Council). This research was con-
ducted during 2015-2019 by Erasmus University Rotterdam and the University 
of Twente in collaboration with Rijkswaterstaat, Rebel Group, Reset 
Management, Twynstra Gudde, Deltares and the Netherlands School for Public 
Administration (NSOB). See: http://smartgovernance-partnerships.org.
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 management, are key. This is in line with research findings, showing 
that the success of DBFM(O) projects is not determined by the con-
tract or strict contract management. Improving the governance of 
PPPs requires a shift from a financially and economically oriented 
contractual approach to a more sociologically inspired relational 
form of governance.
3.1 Introduction
In many countries, public-private partnerships (PPPs) are used to 
 realize major public infrastructure projects. There is nothing inher-
ently new about the notion of public-private partnerships, and they 
occur in many different shapes and sizes (Walker & Smith, 1995). In the 
world of public infrastructure, PPP refers to specific arrangements that 
deviate from the traditional method of public procurement. The under-
lying idea is that intensive cooperation between public and private 
actors will allow for the realization of better, more innovative infra-
s tructural works and services for less money (Akintoye & Beck 2003; 
Hodge, Greve, & Boardman, 2010). The spread of PPP in infrastructure 
management worldwide shows that the expectations are high: PPP 
is supposed to combine the strengths of public and private parties, 
 making it a ‘marriage made in heaven’ (Hodge & Greve, 2005).
The UK has played a pioneering role in the development of PPP 
as a procurement and management method for transport infra-
structure and public buildings in particular. This started with 
the Private Finance Initiative (PFI), which was first introduced by 
the Conservative government in the early 1990s and later updated 
and renamed to PPP and subsequently to Private Finance 2 (PF2), 
thus evolving into an important global standard for PPP practices. 
Countries such as Australia, New Zealand, Canada, South Africa, 
Finland, Belgium and the Netherlands have set up programmes that 
build on the UK’s example, introducing UK-inspired contractual 
partnerships, governed by DBFM(O) contracts and the accompanying 
toolbox with instruments such as standard procedures for procure-
ment, contract management and assessment (e.g. the public-private 
comparator and the private sector comparator). In the Netherlands, 
the introduction of public-private partnerships was spearheaded 
by the Ministry of Finance, following the example set with the PFI 
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in the UK. DMFM(O) contracts, that is, integrated, long-term con-
tracts in which private parties also finance the projects, became 
increasingly prevalent in national projects to build roads, tunnels, 
waterworks and public buildings (Klijn, 2009; Koppenjan & De Jong, 
2018).
Smart arrangements like PPPs, and more specifically DBFM(O), 
face high expectations. When government budgets are limited, 
private funding can ensure that the realization of numerous infra-
structural ambitions remains within reach. Moreover, the innovative 
capabilities of industry can result in the implementation of innova-
tive design, construction and management methods. Because private 
companies bear the financial risks and are better at project and risk 
management than the government, budget and schedule overruns 
become a thing of the past. Competitive tendering results in more 
business-like relationships, better plans and a more innovative, com-
petitive construction sector (Ghobatian, Gallear, O’Regan, & Viney, 
2004; Hodge et al., 2010). It has now become clear, however, that such 
partnerships do not automatically provide the intended results. 
There are specific mechanisms at work that can determine success 
and failure of DBFM(O) projects in the world of public infrastructure. 
In this chapter, we will attempt to come to an understanding of these 
mechanisms by examining theory, practical experiences and research 
findings.
3.2 DBFM(O) Contracts as a Smart Arrangement
As indicated earlier, DBFM(O) contracts are integrated, long-term con-
tracts. The integrated nature of these contracts facilitates risk transfer 
to private parties and makes them responsible for all project phases. 
As a result, companies are forced to form consortiums of develop-
ers, builders, financers and operators in order to bring together the 
required knowledge and resources.
The consensus view is that because this private consortium 
finances the project itself, it has an incentive to explore innovations 
during the design phase that will lead to cost reductions and opti-
mization in later phases (see Dutch Audit Office, 2013). This method, 
for instance, can encourage consortiums to design more sustain-
able buildings. Furthermore, consortiums can opt to invest more 
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at the front end of the project with the aim of reducing operational 
costs in the final phase. Thus, DBFM(O) contracts lead to optimized 
designs, efficiency gains and better value for money (realizing and 
operating the same project at a lower cost, or with more function-
ality at the same price). On the other hand, the long-term nature of 
the contracts gives private parties the opportunity to recoup their 
investment. In the Netherlands, the government typically pays pri-
vate parties for infrastructure when it is made available. This creates 
power ful financial incentives for private parties to deliver the pro-
ject on time, within budget and according to the agreed upon scope 
(Dutch Audit Office, 2013; Koppenjan, 2008; Osborne, 2000).
In the Netherlands, the Directorate-General for Public Works 
and Water Management and the Central Government Real Estate 
Agency are the two main users of DBFM(O) contracts.1 As of 2016, 
37 PPP projects had been completed throughout the country, repre-
senting a total value of EUR 37 billion and creating added value worth 
EUR 1.5 billion, according to the Ministry of Finance (Ministerie van 
Financiën, 2016). Well-known projects that were or are being realized 
this way include the Ministry of Finance building, the Kromhout 
Barracks in Utrecht, the National Military Museum in Soesterberg, 
the A59 Den Bosch-Oss motorway, the second Coentunnel, the A15 
Maasvlakte-Vaanplein motorway, the Harnaschpolder Waste Water 
Treatment Plant and the new sea lock in IJmuiden. The Ministry of 
Finance has adopted the policy of encouraging other ministries and 
subnational authorities to implement this type of contract as well 
(Ministerie van Financiën, 2016).
3.3 Problems with DBFM(O)
Although the progress reports published by the Dutch Ministry of 
Finance (2016) state that the implementation of DBFM(O) contracts has 
led to successful projects, some projects face major problems. The long 
duration of the projects, for instance, has turned out to have its down-
1 The Directorate-General for Public Works and Water Management generally 
opts against including operations (the ‘O’) in its DBFM contracts, preferring 
instead to act as the operating agency itself. The Central Government Real 
Estate Agency does typically include an operations component in its contracts.
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sides. Within existing agreements and contracts, there are simply not 
enough opportunities to respond to rapid technological developments 
and infrastructural innovations, such as the use of information tech-
nology and big data. Furthermore, technical and financial setbacks 
led to conflicts between the government and industry partners, as was 
the case for the second Coentunnel, the A15 Maasvlakte-Vaanplein 
motorway and, more recently, the IJmuiden sea lock (Ministerie van 
Financiën, 2016). Hitches and complications put various companies on 
the brink of financial ruin, while the government remained convinced 
that these financial problems had to be resolved by the market itself. 
It believed that consortiums, faced with low demand in the wake of 
the financial crisis, had proposed lowball budgets for opportunistic 
reasons and, accordingly, ran into trouble during the project. The con-
sortiums, on the other hand, believed it was unjust that they alone had 
to pay for these unexpected financial setbacks and felt that it was up to 
the government to help. Ultimately, this resulted in further deteriora-
tion of relationships, stagnations and cost overruns (Rijkswaterstaat, 
2016a).
These examples are enough to show that the typical properties of 
DBFM(O) contracts and the risk distribution, performance criteria, 
monitoring regime and payment mechanism specified in these con-
tracts alone will not necessarily lead to the expected benefits of PPPs 
(value for money and innovation). These practical experiences are 
confirmed by a survey study (conducted in mid-2014) among public 
and private managers of all PPP projects known at the time. In this 
study, no positive correlation was found between contract properties, 
such as the duration of the contract and penalty clauses, and the out-
comes of PPP projects. Penalty clauses, it turned out, even had 
a negative effect (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016). No relationship between 
contract properties and innovation was found either, although a 
clear link was established between trust and management, on the 
one hand, and outcomes, on the other (Warsen, Nederhand, Klijn, 
Grotenbreg, & Koppenjan, 2018). Generally speaking, PPP- projects 
with more inter-party trust and better, more active relationship 
management between public and private parties, perform better 
than projects in which these are lacking (see Warsen et al., 2018). 
These findings are in line with results from other studies in both 
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the Netherlands and other countries (Alam, Kahir, & Chaudhri, 2014; 
DeClerck, 2015; Kort, Verweij, & Klijn, 2016; Panda, 2016; Smyth & 
Edkins, 2007; Steijn, Klijn, & Edelenbos, 2011).
In response to these conflicts in PPP projects, public and private 
parties in the Dutch construction industry met in 2016, taking the 
joint initiative of rethinking the nature of partnerships in the realiza-
tion and management of public infrastructure in what they called the 
new market vision (Rijkswaterstaat, 2016a; 2016b). The market vision 
strives to effect a shift from a predominantly contractual approach of 
PPP to a more social, relational one, constituting an attempt to make 
partnership governance smarter.
By embracing the market vision, public and private parties indi-
cate that they experience the limitations of the contractual, financial 
and economic focus on PPP as a major problem. In their quest to find a 
new way of working together, they emphasize the importance of good 
relationships, openness, transparency and trust. By paying more 
attention to the relational component of partnerships, they strive to 
improve risk distribution, ensuring that partners are aware of each 
other’s risks and support each other in managing them. Fair pricing, 
with realistic margins for businesses, is another key aim to ensure 
that opportunistic proposals disappear. Its realization, however, 
requires that both public and private parties change their attitudes 
(Rijkswaterstaat, 2016a).
Recent events in the UK demonstrate that this development is 
not an exclusively Dutch phenomenon. As the country from which 
DBFM(O) contracts were originally imported, the UK is a few steps 
ahead when it comes to the development of these contracts. In 2010, 
for instance, HM Treasury acknowledged that the added value of 
many of the hundreds of active PPP projects in the UK was being 
jeopardized by the worsening quality of relationships and part-
nerships throughout the multi-year maintenance and operation 
phases included in the contracts. In an attempt to counter this 
threat, it introduced a new approach, which saw the Private Finance 
Initiative renamed as Private Finance 2 (PF2). Recently, all parties 
involved in DBFM(O) projects were invited to sign a code of con-
duct, as a moral appeal to realize value for money in their respective 
partner ships (HM Treasury, 2012; 2013; see also Weihe, 2008).
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3.4 Shift in Governance Mechanisms: From Contractual to 
Relational Governance
The new market vision sees public and private parties in the public 
infrastructure sector looking for new partnership and governance 
principles with a relational basis rather than an economic one. 
DBFM(O) contracts are based primarily on the principles of the insti-
tutional economy (Lowndes & Roberts, 2013; Williamson, 1979), which 
pre supposes rational actors that engage in calculating behaviour. 
These actors use a ‘logic of consequences’: They choose the most advan-
tageous behaviours for themselves based on their interests and any 
(external) incentives. Contractual agreements, payment mechanisms 
and penalties serve to create the right incentive structure to ensure 
that private parties contribute to public projects and services. This line 
of reasoning results in detailed contracts that try to cover all possible 
risks up front. A relational approach, on the other hand, is based on a 
more sociologically inspired logic, in which actors are led not only by 
their interests and incentives but by standards and values as well. They 
choose their behaviour on the basis of a ‘logic of appropriateness’, of 
what they believe to be right and fitting, and this means that they are 
also sensitive to other governance methods. Apart from external incen-
tives, they are guided by an intrinsic motivation. The role of the group 
they belong to and the team they work in also matter, as does trust. 
Detailed contracts and strict contract management do not match these 
types of relationships. Contracts will be more generic by nature, allow-
ing for flexibility. Relational governance, then, focuses on promoting 
interaction; information sharing, sharing insights and expectations; 
and strengthening a shared identity and mutual trust (Macneil & 
Campbell, 2001; Smyth & Edkins, 2007). In short, the market vision 
proposes a completely different way of collaborating and governing 
than the economically oriented governance model that underlies 
DBFM(O) contracts presupposes. Naturally, these mechanisms are ideal 
types that occur in a mixed form in reality. The Directorate-General for 
Public Works and Water Management, for instance, has indicated that 
the new market vision for DBDM(O) projects does not mean that com-
petition or the use of standard contracts will be abandoned. However, 
changes will be made to how risk is distributed, and partners will strive 
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for improved cooperation and transparent communication, while seek-
ing to avoid opportunistic behaviour (Rijkswaterstaat, 2016b).
As current PPP projects are still primarily based on detailed, 
almost complete contracts, the question remains whether 
(and which) combinations of relational and contractual approaches 
are possible.
3.5 Three Distinct Governance Pathways to Excellent PPP 
Performance
To study how contractual and relational governance mesh, the authors 
of this chapter compared 25 PPP projects in the Netherlands and 
Flanders. On the basis of interviews with 74 public and private profes-
sionals involved in these projects, we used a Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis (QCA) to determine which combinations of hard, contractual 
conditions and soft, relational conditions were present in excellent 
PPP projects (see Warsen Klijn, & Koppenjan, 2019 for the detailed 
results).2 Prior studies into inter-organization collaboration have also 
suggested that contractual and relational conditions are complemen-
tary and that a combination can therefore lead to good collaboration 
(Poppo & Zenger, 2002). In practice, a combination of both conditions 
also seems the most likely to occur. Despite the fact that the market 
vision opts for a more relational approach, contracts will remain part 
of public-private partnerships. Some of the conditions included in the 
study therefore represent the contract and how it will be implemented: 
risk allocation and strict contract management. Risk allocation deter-
mines which responsibilities are transferred from the public to the 
private partner and therefore has a significant influence on the project. 
Strict contract management refers to how the contract is enforced 
in practice, primarily focusing on fines and penalties for inadequate 
performance. Trust and conflict management are two conditions with 
a more relational nature. Many studies label trust as a critical success 
2 QCA is a method that allows for the systematic analyses of a larger number 
of cases than a regular qualitative comparative case study. It studies the 
combined effect of conditions (rather than testing individual variables) in 
an attempt to do justice to the complexity of potential causal relationships. 
A QCA assumes the principle of equifinality, which means that there are vari-
ous, non-mutually exclusive paths that can lead to the same outcome.
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factor: it can prevent opportunistic behaviour and encourage parties 
to share information and invest in the project. Conflict management 
is about the way in which disputes and differences of opinion are 
resolved. This condition is a process, which goes beyond the traditional 
‘escalation ladder’ included in standard contracts.
Three combinations of conditions appeared to be related to excel-
lent performance (see Table 1). In this context, excellence means that 
the projects were realized on time and within the set budget, and 
that they represented value for money, which are the usual crite-
ria for determining the success of (PPP) projects. It must be noted 
that there are various ways of interpreting value for money. From 
a financial- economic point of view, value equates to efficiency: 
achieving the same results at a lower cost or more functionality for 
the same price. However, value for money can also be understood 
from a broader perspective, encompassing aspects such as innova-
tion, learning experiences and improved relationships. These factors 
can be more difficult to determine, and so we opted for a more qual-
itative approach to assessing outcomes and performance: the extent 
to which the interviewed stakeholders were satisfied with the project 
outcomes, in broader terms than time and money alone.
First and foremost, we found that the combination of inter-partner 
trust (a soft condition) and good risk allocation prior to the pro-
ject (a hard condition) led to adequately to very highly performing 
PPP projects. A risk distribution in which not all risks are assumed 
by the private partner forms a good basis for cooperation, because 
the partners share the project risks together. Trust will then help 
the partners navigate unexpected circumstances during the course 
of the project. A second successful combination of conditions was 
found to consist of good risk allocation, strict contract management 
(two hard conditions) and good conflict management (a soft condi-
tion). This combination emphasizes the value of making good, clear 
agreements about how risks are allocated and how disputes are dealt 
with, as well as the importance of enforcing these agreements. When 
this combination of conditions is present, trust is not a necessary 
condition for good performance. The third combination of conditions 
found in successful PPP projects is composed of exclusively relational 
components. In this case, the ‘soft’ relational conditions of trust 
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and conflict management are combined with the absence of strict 
contract management, which, when taken together, are sufficient 
conditions for successful cooperation. This combination emphasizes 
the importance of social relationships between public and private 
partners in PPP projects. What is remarkable is that the absence of 
strict contract management is linked to successful PPP performance, 
as it is an important part of this configuration. It gives both partners 
the opportunity to come up with solutions to problems that would 
not have been possible with strict contract management, thus provid-
ing flexibility.
Table 1 Combinations of conditions for excellent performance
‘Hard’ contract conditions ‘Soft’ relational conditions
Strict 
 contract 
management
Risk 
 allocation
Conflict 
management
Trust
Combination 1  
Combination 2   
Combination 3   
Although discussions about PPP governance are often centred on 
either the importance of a good contract and strict contract manage-
ment or governance based on soft aspects, our analysis of 25 Flemish 
and Dutch projects shows that there are multiple success ful com-
binations of contractual and relational gover nance conditions. 
It is interesting to note that a successful combination was found 
consisting entirely of soft, relational conditions but that no such 
combination was found made up exclusively of hard, contractual 
conditions. Contractual conditions lead to excellent performance 
only when they are combined with soft, more relational conditions 
(Warsen et al., 2019).
3.6 Conclusion
We have made clear progress in the quest for better, smart gover-
nance arrangements for PPPs in recent years. Practical experience 
and research have taught us that focusing on hard factors, such as 
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strict contract management and risk allocation, is not the best way to 
manage PPP projects. PPP projects are complex and take place amid 
ever-changing surroundings, and therefore trust and flexibility are 
crucial when it comes to achieving success. The importance of the shift 
from contractual to relational governance mechanisms is supported 
in academia and in practice and is expressed by the new market vision 
embraced by the government and market parties in the Netherlands, 
as well as by the acceptance of the PF2 policy the UK. We cannot be 
sure, though, whether this will lead to changes in practice, with better 
PPP projects as a result. Currently, the market vision is not much more 
than a declaration of intent: It describes desirable behaviour but offers 
few specific suggestions as to how governance based on good rela-
tionships and trust can be implemented. Research findings, literature 
on partnership governance and discussions in practice suggest that 
a shift to relational PPP governance could be kick-started by having 
partners draw up process agreements about how they will deal with 
differences in interpretation, changing circumstances, disputes and 
roles. In addition, platforms will have to be created for public and pri-
vate parties to engage in continuous dialogue and form unified teams 
(Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016; Warsen et al., 2019). In addition to content, 
management should also focus on building good relationships, trust, 
bringing together the right personalities, forming a common identity 
and ensuring continuity. It is also clear that such relational governance 
methods make specific demands with regard to the skills and personal-
ities of managers on both the public and private side. Little is currently 
known about the organizational conditions that will allow these gover-
nance methods to flourish. So here is a knowledge gap waiting for 
future research. At the same time, it is evident that relational gover-
nance will not be able to completely replace contracts and contract 
management. Although we found a pathway with only soft conditions, 
in most instances relational governance will not compensate entirely 
for the shortcomings of ‘hard’ conditions such as poor contracts, 
insufficient budgets, a lack of public and private support and impos-
sible assignments. In essence, governance of PPPs faces the challenge 
of hybridity, not only in combining the public and private but also in 
balancing hard and soft contract and governance conditions.
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Chapter 4 
Local Government and 
Community Engagement: 
Hybrid Governance in the 
Social Care Domain
Annie de Roo and Rob Jagtenberg
In most Western countries, the demand for publicly funded profes-
sional care is growing, while public resources decline. Engaging 
citizens’ networks to substitute professional care is perceived as 
a possible solution, inter alia in the Netherlands, where a fun-
damental reform of the social domain was launched in 2015. 
The assumptions underlying this reform, and the policy instruments 
positioned thereto, are compared with outcomes obtained through 
a multi- annual survey of citizens in need of care, and of care profes-
sionals, in a large urban area (Rotterdam).
Various forms of hybrid governance have developed, with either 
care professionals (clinical governance) or clients’ social networks 
(self-governance) assuming a preponderant role.
For these hybrid governance arrangements there is scope to be 
qualified as ‘smart’, provided further steps are taken to optimize 
strengths and minimize weaknesses in each governance mode. 
First, self-governance and clinical governance outcomes will need 
ongoing monitoring, so as to fine-tune their effectiveness in rela-
tion to social problem characteristics and network characteristics. 
Second, the legitimacy of professional intervention needs to be 
enhanced by raising both clients’ and professionals’ awareness of 
network plan-making rights. This regulatory aspect underlying the 
2015 Dutch social care reform provides, at the same time, a basis for 
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an enlargement of resources needed to test the full potential of net-
work engagement in the social care domain.
4.1 Introduction: Governance Contexts in the Social Domain
4.1.1  Traditional Governance in the Social Care Domain
The research discussed in this chapter is on governance in the social 
care domain in the Netherlands. ‘Social care’ encompasses interven-
tions by highly diverse professionals in a wide range of problem areas, 
ranging from debts, domestic violence, neglect of children and hous-
ing problems to mental health and ageing issues. There is some overlap 
with the medical sector, but the social care domain is considerably 
wider.
In the Netherlands, as elsewhere, a host of social support schemes 
has been introduced in the late twentieth century, resulting in a rapid 
growth in the number and range of care professionals, like social 
workers, behavioural therapists, and debt managers.
The services of these increasingly specialized and privately orga-
nized care professionals became publicly funded through schemes 
at national or provincial levels mostly. Professionals would decide 
about a client’s entitlement to subsidized care, whereby each entitle-
ment tended to be geared to a singular problem of an individual 
child or individual adult. Occasionally, this amounted to various 
specialists operating without (any) coordination in one family. In the 
client- professional relationship, clinical governance prevailed (‘doctor 
knows best’), while bureaucratic mechanisms defined the granting of 
subsidies based on professionally endorsed entitlements.
Around the year 2000, however, dissatisfaction with the care sys-
tem became manifest. Care professionals had become focused on 
individuals as mere objects of professional intervention, at a time 
when rights of citizens in need of care became firmly anchored inter-
nationally in the human rights discourse. This included the right of 
families and of children to have a voice in any professional interven-
tion (Yishai, 2012). A legitimacy problem thus arose.
Moreover, the social domain had become compartmentalized and 
supply-driven. People in need of care had become passive consumers 
of publicly funded services (De Boer & Van der Lans, 2011). This gave 
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rise to doubts about efficient and effective government spending. 
The legitimacy and efficacy arguments converged in pleas for active 
involvement of social networks in the care domain. Similar criti-
cism resonated in other countries. The UK, with David Cameron’s 
‘Big Society’ project, constitutes a good example, the device being 
“society is not a spectator sport” (Civil Exchange, 2015)
4.2 A Challenge to Traditional Governance in the Social 
Domain: Self­Governance through Family Group 
Conferences
Social care thus presents itself as a wicked problem, if only because of 
the lack of consensus about the extent to which professional knowl-
edge is required in the first place and for what kind of problems. 
Then there is (1) the controversy about the value to be accorded to the 
provision of care by publicly funded professionals, (2) the right for cit-
izens in need of care to be involved together with one’s family network 
in the decision-making about care, and (3) the duty for care profession-
als and citizens to organize family support so as to contribute to the 
restoration of social cohesion and civil society and/or alleviation of the 
national budget.
Some of these reasons inspired critical care professionals in the 
Netherlands to launch a private organization in the year 2000 to 
host Family Group Conferences (FGCs) from the idealistic motive of 
 placing the life-world of families back at the centre (Clarijs, 2012).
An FGC is essentially a decision-making process, where persons 
in need of support and members of their network come together to 
discuss main concerns and make a plan to address these. For FGCs, 
preparation is of fundamental importance. A coordinator, who is 
independent of the public authorities, and who ‘speaks the language’ 
of the family, helps the family to prepare for the meeting, by locat-
ing family members or others in the community who may be of 
assistance. This can be time-consuming, when relationships are com-
plicated or problems were concealed from the outside world.
During the conference itself, any professionals involved leave, and 
the family is left alone to discuss their concerns among themselves 
and devise a plan. This stage of ‘private family time’ when the family 
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itself must be creative constitutes the heart of the FGC. For example, 
where a single parent fails in the upbringing of a child, an uncle 
and aunt may take over and provide a temporary home for the child. 
Or a houseowner attending the conference may forgo eviction for 
arrears of rent if a friend offers a job opportunity that will be instru-
mental in the dweller paying off his debts.
The ‘private family time’ stage is particularly conducive to the 
social network tapping into its resources and identifying shared pri-
orities.
4.2.1 International Antecedents of FGCs and the Dutch Variety
The FGC concept was first developed in New Zealand to meet a demand 
from the indigenous Maori community that the government should 
create opportunities for the community itself to arrange for kinship 
care rather than placing children in the state care system. In 1989, 
the FGC became a statutory right in New Zealand (Levine, 2000).
The concept spread over many countries, including the United 
States and the UK, where FGCs are deployed mainly in the child 
protection domain, and where authorities such as court-appointed 
guardians play a supervisory role. A family network may then be 
instrumental in reducing ‘outside interference’, thus catering to 
social network empowerment.
In the Netherlands, FGCs are available in all social domains, 
including subsidized care that citizens voluntarily apply for: young-
sters, the lonely and the elderly, people with disabilities, those in debt 
and spouses entangled in a bitter divorce and custody battle.
Where network support by volunteers substitutes applied-for, 
state-funded care, FGCs become a potentially attractive tool for public 
administrators. However, organizing FGCs also entails costs, nota-
bly for the preparation time invested by the coordinator. The critical 
professionals confessing to the FGC approach set up a private non-
profit organization, the Eigen Kracht Centrale, providing such trained 
coordinators, charging a standard fee for their services. As from 
2000 onwards several provinces (since 1 January 2015: municipalities) 
began to subsidize set numbers of such FGCs (Netherlands Youth 
Institute, 2010).
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4.3 The 2015 Transformation: Network Engagement at the 
Centre
FGCs can be said to embody network self-governance as an antidote 
against the legitimacy deficit of traditional clinical governance in the 
social care system. However, it was the efficiency drawbacks of the tra-
ditional system (supply-driven care and passive care consumers) that 
triggered a governmental reform policy, which culminated in a com-
plete restructuring of the social care system per 1 January 2015.
The reform entailed a localization of public responsibilities to the 
level of municipal government. Municipalities were expected to work 
‘close-to-the-client’, detecting problems at an early stage. Proactive 
measures would prevent problems from escalating and likely generate 
savings on public funding (Dijkhoff, 2014).
This objective of the Dutch social care reform can be summarized 
in two sentences: “Whenever possible, social care and support should 
be provided by citizens’ own social network. This will enhance citi-
zens’ autonomy and sense of social responsibility; simultaneously, 
public spending can thus be reduced.”
The total budget available to municipalities for the tasks conferred 
on them was much smaller than the sum at the disposal of central 
and provincial levels before. Community engagement as a means to 
replace publicly funded care had to materialize swiftly in view of the 
limited resources.
At this point, regulation was considered a key steering instrument: 
network engagement became statutorily anchored. The Dutch reform 
legislation replaced the traditional system of professionally endorsed 
entitlements by a mere ‘general duty’ for municipalities to provide 
support, whereby it was left to the local authorities to organize the 
provision of care as they saw fit. Most municipalities introduced local 
Neighbourhood Teams (NTs) as the key vehicle, staffed by a selec-
tion of care professionals tailored to meet local needs (Winter, 2015). 
Most importantly, the new legislation prioritizes self-reliance of citi-
zens when they apply to these NTs for municipal support.
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4.3.1  Envisaged Hybrid Governance: The Neighbourhood Teams
The institutional status of NTs may vary between municipalities. 
In Rotterdam (where the research was conducted), the forty-four NTs 
operate on the basis of a contract awarded by the municipality to cer-
tain private care providers on a successful bid following a public tender 
procedure. The NTs are co-staffed by municipal civil servants, and in 
that sense their composition is hybrid by their very nature.
NT professionals are supposed to operate in an ‘outreaching’ 
 manner, discussing a client’s needs at the client’s ‘kitchen table’ with 
the client himself and possibly his family members, as they will likely 
be involved too. Such a role requires the NT professional to become a 
generalist, practicing a whole-family approach and involving clients’ 
networks. From the professional’s perspective, combining clinical 
judgement with an open, collaborative mindset, means that network 
self-governance is to be granted a complementary role (Barnhoorn 
et al., 2013). Thus here, governance is expected to assume a hybrid 
 character (Johanson & Vakkuri, 2017).
4.4 How the New Governance Arrangements Evolved in Practice
The research project, ‘Hybrid Local Governance in Multiple Social 
Domains’, which was co-funded by the Dutch Research Council (NWO) 
and the municipality of Rotterdam, aimed to ascertain whether these 
high expectations about network support and ‘enabling’ professionals 
have been met thus far.
In order to identify factors co-determinant for an effective appeal 
to client autonomy and sustainable network support, data were 
collected at the micro level, among citizens in need of care and 
among professionals. Towards this end, over 100 respondents were 
interviewed twice, divided almost equally over network members 
attending FGCs (55 conference dossiers) and clients of NTs or their 
relatives (60 NT dossiers). In addition, some 35 professionals, mostly 
care workers from the NTs, were interviewed, as well as several inde-
pendent FGC coordinators.
An important finding is that in the majority of cases in both 
groups, that is, NT clients and FGC participants, network mem-
bers and care professionals offered support. This is not surprising: 
many problems require continued professional assistance, while, 
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 conversely, professional support is simply not available 24/7. For one 
thing, this means that in the FGC approach, self-governance in theory 
often comes down to hybrid governance in practice (where in the NT’s 
clinical governance was changed into hybrid governance). But unlike 
in the NT’s, in the FGC model professionals will often be perceived to 
play a complementary role. In the FGC philosophy it is the network 
that directs the process of identifying solutions. With reference to 
Arnstein’s ‘participation ladder’, FGCs thus go beyond the mere con-
sultation of networks (Clarijs, 2012).
A comparison of both groups, NT and FGC, is of particular interest 
in gaining a better insight into the relative weight of professional 
authority and habitus when it comes to engaging networks. After all, 
the legislation that underlies the 2015 transformation incentivizes 
NT professionals to investigate the prospects of network support 
first. It is provided that NTs, in their assessment of applications for 
 support, should support only those citizens who have shown an 
 in ability to help themselves.
There is thus a near-duty to engage networks imposed on profes-
sionals, as well as on citizens. The NT professionals interviewed for 
this project, however, often report they lack the resources (especially 
time) to thoroughly map out, contact and ‘prepare’ network mem-
bers. Social networks cannot be activated by simply ticking a box. 
It appears that administrative burdens now determine daily life in 
the teams, with professionals spending a large part of their time 
filling out forms to account for their activities. It is therefore not 
surprising that in the group of NT clients surveyed, not one single 
case has surfaced where a professional convened a meeting with net-
work members to discuss the allocation of tasks and responsibilities. 
A contributory factor here may well be that professionals would natu-
rally take the lead in such meetings, as they are professionally trained 
to do. Nevertheless, in many NT cases, network members already sup-
ported, of their own volition, the person in need of care. Without their 
support many professionals might be greatly inconvenienced.
NT professionals also indicated their personal criteria for involv-
ing, or rather not involving, social networks. Interestingly, a majority 
of professionals do not want to involve networks in cases where 
several serious problems have surfaced simultaneously. In the FGC 
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group, however, where, by definition, networks were mobilized, 
the sheer number of simultaneous, serious problems significantly 
exceeded the number of problems in the NT group. This outcome is 
all the more intriguing, as even in the face of such complexities, the 
longer-term effect of FGC network support appeared fairly positive, 
in the sense that the sheer number and the seriousness of problems 
experienced had been reduced.
This outcome suggests that professionals may be prejudiced when 
it comes to involving networks. Does clinical governance still domi-
nate over the collaborative approach, envisaged for NTs?
In the FGC group, two largely shared views draw attention. On the 
one hand, there is much appreciation for the coordinator, whose 
lengthy preparations were found instrumental to successful network 
engagement. But, on the other hand, many respondents were dis-
appointed that there was no follow-up to such conferences; many 
felt ‘left to themselves’ afterwards. So even active citizens remain 
un certain, desiring back-up support or reassurance, for example, 
from the coordinator.
The FGC agency recognizes these reactions and has come to stress 
the importance of ‘connectivity’ between social networks and pro-
fessional care, with FGCs performing an important role to bridge the 
distance between the two.
To conclude on the micro level survey, in the majority of dossiers 
analysed, network support has endured and resulted in a reduction of 
problems (volume and/or seriousness), ranging from modest to con-
siderable, and in an increase in perceived self-help ability.
This outcome should be treated with care, however, owing to pos-
sible selection bias. In the FGC group, persons apparently had already 
decided to make an effort to organize network support, whereas in the 
NT group, respondents were selected by professionals who may have 
left out particularly troubled, aggressive families as ‘hopeless’ cases.
4.5 Consequences: Hybrid, but also ‘Smart’ Hybrid 
Governance?
Both within the FGC group and within the NT group, hybrid modes of 
governance have thus materialized, combining clinical governance with 
self-governance, albeit in different proportions. This is the situation 
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today at the micro level of client social networks and care profes-
sionals.
To be sure, hierarchy and market mechanisms are also at work, 
at the higher intermediate level of municipal governments executing 
public procurement procedures to select a) specialized care provid-
ers (market) that NTs may refer to and b) municipalities imposing 
detailed regulation and budgetary constraints on NTs and FGCs 
 (hierarchy).
But can this present constellation of governance arrangements 
also be termed ‘smart’?
Smart hybrid governance materializes where different modes of 
governance are combined in an intelligent way, by reinforcing the 
strength and mitigating the weakness of each governance mode, 
prefer ably without costly reforms (see Chapter 1).
4.5.1 Effectiveness
As to the subject area under review in this chapter, intelligent combi-
nations should first and foremost be effective (see also Torfing, Peters, 
Pierre, & Sørensen, 2012). Significantly, policy statements underlying 
the 2015 ‘transformation’ did not differentiate on the basis of the nature 
of problems or the size and composition of citizens’ social networks. 
The assumption is that networks are always available and can always be 
activated in any kind of problem situation.
The project outcomes, however, demonstrate that the nature of 
problems does matter.
Whether or not a combination of approaches is effective depends 
largely on the nature of problems at stake. Three different scenarios 
were distilled from the analysed cases, which embody a gradual shift 
from self-governance (i.e. enduring network support) being more 
dominant to clinical governance (i.e. professional control and over-
sight) being more dominant. These scenarios have been identified 
as ‘substitution’, because the network replaced professional care; 
‘division of labour’, because the network took up some tasks, leaving 
other tasks to the professionals; and ‘monitoring’, because network 
members took on the task of serving as an extra pair of eyes for the 
professional (who cannot be around 24/7), to increase the efficacy 
of professional support. Basically, ‘substitution’ is found mostly in 
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regard to care for children; ‘division of labour’ takes place mostly 
where mental and disability problems are left for the professionals, 
whereas the network takes on domestic responsibilities; ‘monitor-
ing’ often materializes in view of parenting skills and minor mental 
 problems.
There are also problem areas where network support seems to be 
of no avail, notably when financial problems abound. In this respect 
it may be significant that networks are reported to consist mainly 
of persons in the ‘inner circle’ of the nuclear family or close friends, 
whereas exactly ‘outer circles’ (colleagues at work, hobby clubs, 
churches) may provide the contacts necessary to find a way out of 
debts.
In conclusion, the findings suggest there may be more opportu-
nities to rely on clients’ networks than many professionals might be 
inclined to think.
However, there are two challenges on the way towards optimal com-
bination of network and professional support.
First, there is a resource problem plaguing the NT professionals. 
The record of FGC coordinators suggests one must be prepared to 
invest time to get networks moving. This is confirmed in the liter-
ature. It appears that NTs generally have difficulty in meeting the 
target of actively engaging networks (Kruiter, Bredewold, & Ham, 
2016). On average, an NT professional has 2 to 3 hours, as part of intake 
conversations with new clients, to develop a picture of their network. 
By contrast, an independent FGC coordinator takes twenty-five hours 
on average to not only meet members of the network but also actively 
enlarge the network, with ‘snowballing’ techniques, as part of 
the important preparatory stage that precedes a conference. In a num-
ber of cases analysed, such a thorough preparation seemed to have 
paid off, resulting in efficiency gains (a strength of the FGC approach). 
A tentative conclusion is that one needs to invest first, before gains 
can be realized.
The FGC findings suggest there is a need for follow-up and further 
reassurance to capitalize on the potential network support assem-
bled.
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In any event, making more time available to NT professionals 
to work with clients appears desirable, inter alia, in light of the 
 statutory obligations. Additional time may be secured by reducing 
the administrative burdens, for example, by combining data systems; 
experiments abroad have yielded interesting results. More impor-
tantly, time may be saved by involving the FGC know-how in 
NT-practice, particularly in complicated cases, and at an early stage. 
Such arrangements could be characterized as ‘smart’.
Just the same, additional resources may be needed to gain expe-
rience with such an alignment of approaches. What is more, it may 
be validly argued that central government is under an obligation to 
provide such additional resources for this particular purpose, as the 
involvement of social networks has been entrenched in national leg-
islation. A statutory right for citizens in need of care to devise a plan 
together with their own network was only introduced as per 1 January 
2015 (see infra, at legitimacy). This particular right is moreover – and 
paradoxically – tied with the implied duty for municipal NTs to seek 
network engagement first. As any other new public responsibility, 
this one too must be enabled by appropriate resources.
The second challenge is to purposively select and invest in cases 
where there is a reasonable prospect of engaging networks success-
fully. In the present research project, a first step has been made to 
identify co-determinative factors (and estimate their contribution), 
including the nature and duration of problems, the role of personal 
background variables and the characteristics of social networks. 
Continuous monitoring of such factors will be helpful, and this can 
be accomplished ‘smartly’, through minor adaptations in current 
municipal registration systems. The more evidence-based and fine-
tuned network involvement can become, the less time will be wasted 
and fewer opportunities missed where networks might be helpful, 
despite professional hunches to the contrary.
4.5.2 Legitimacy: The Multiple Faces of Regulation
Regulation has appeared as a key steering instrument to incentivize 
network engagement, notably through new legislation underpinning 
the major 2015 reforms. Municipalities should provide support only 
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when citizens and their networks are unable to help themselves or one 
other.
The 2015 reform bills canvassing citizens’ self-help duties, have led 
members of parliament to insert an amendment, granting citizens in 
need of care the right to devise a support plan together with their own 
network. Professionals should take such a plan essentially as the basis 
for their further interventions and support.
It has appeared from the interviews conducted in the project, that 
this statutory right is hardly known, even among professionals. 
A handful of lawyers are aware and have assisted clients with invok-
ing this right against professionals in a supervisory role, such as 
child protection boards or family guardians.
The ‘rights’ dimension of family engagement is crucial to the legit-
imacy of (municipal) government action in the social domain. Could 
this right thwart the selection of clients on the basis of expected 
effectiveness by care professionals? Could a client and her network 
exact publicly funded professional support from municipalities, by 
invoking their own (right to make a) plan calling for all sorts of exter-
nal support?
The selection of clients ‘with a promise of network support’, as dis-
cussed supra (under the heading of effectiveness), can be at odds with 
network engagement as a right accruing to citizens. For example, if a 
parent with an intellectual disability and financial problems insists 
that he solves the problematic raising of his child together with his 
near relatives, can the professional then continue to insist that profes-
sional guidance is to be preferred here? Or conversely, when a client 
has administrative problems but an extensive and well-educated fam-
ily living nearby who might assist him, can the client then continue 
to insist on state-funded assistance with his paperwork? Here, an 
inherent tension becomes manifest between requirements of effec-
tiveness and legitimacy.
At any rate, lack of trust in the motives of citizens ‘practicing’ 
self-governance is a recognized problem wherever top-down and 
bottom- up steering instruments and control mechanisms are com-
bined, as in the hybrid governance varieties that have emerged in the 
Dutch social domain.
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Chapter 5 
Shedding Light on Hybrid 
City-Region Governance: 
Effectiveness and Legitimacy 
in Four Metropolitan Areas
Linze Schaap, Carlo Colombo, Maaike Damen and Niels Karsten
This chapter contains an analysis of the effectiveness and legitimacy 
of modes of governance in four European city regions that show clear 
characteristics of hybrid governance in the sense that they combine 
both private and public features. This approach is used by the cities 
of Berlin, Eindhoven, Copenhagen-Malmö and Zürich to enhance 
the problem-solving ability of their regional governance and to apply 
new smart governance arrangements in a complex and multilayered 
environment. Each of the four cities has its own way of searching for 
effective links with public, private and social partners, but the issue 
of legitimacy remains underexposed. Risks with regard to effective-
ness and legitimacy are inherent in hybrid forms of governance, 
but they may equally offer new opportunities for good governance.
5.1 Introduction
There is an increasing tendency to see city regions as focal points for 
social and technological innovation in response to economic, social 
and ecological challenges (OECD, 2011). At the same time, urban 
regional governance gives rise to its own and unique governance 
challenges, because regional governance typically involves a vari-
ety of public, private and societal actors, each of which is organized 
on a different territorial basis. Metropolitan areas may be func-
tionally cohesive in terms of labour, mobility, economy and safety, 
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but  administrative borders often do not correspond exactly to them, 
not least because each social issue has its own scale (Dahl & Tufte, 1973; 
Skelcher, Sullivan & Jeffares, 2013). Even when the borders of a certain 
functional area are clear, they do not always mean the same for private 
parties – who also have an important role to play – as for governing 
actors. The ability to respond effectively to societal challenges in a 
regional context therefore requires innovative forms of organization 
and cooperation that incorporate administrative units, social partners, 
businesses and – on occasion – citizens, in addition to any existing 
arrangements. These so-called ‘hybrid forms of governance’ combine 
the underlying principles of both private and public governance in 
their modes of steering urban regional policies (Engel, 2001). In urban 
regions, in particular, the traditional legal, administrative and orga-
nizational boundaries between what is public and what is private are 
being put under increasing pressure (Levelt & Metze, 2014).
In this chapter, we will assess several forms of hybrid urban 
regional governance from the perspective of two key criteria of 
good governance: effectiveness and legitimacy (Dahl & Tufte, 1973; 
Hendriks, 2010; Van den Dool, Hendriks, Gianoli, & Schaap, 2015). 
More specifically, these criteria pertain to the ability to develop 
 strategic policies that coordinate the actions of the various partners 
and the support enjoyed by the organization in this role from both 
partners and external actors, respectively.
5.2 Evaluating Hybrid Urban Regional Governance
Hybrid forms of governance face high expectations. They are sup-
posed to outperform traditional forms of governance in terms of 
problem-solving (Harrison & Hoyler, 2014) and to be more proficient 
at finding solutions for contemporary, complex, multilevel social 
issues. All in all, hybrid governance is expected to provide the neces-
sary gover nance capacities to manage complex city regions and their 
respective societal challenges.
However, hybrid governance might equally be less effective in 
tackling long-term urban regional issues than expected. Because 
urban regional governance involves a wide range of different actors 
with their own logics and identities, conflicts may arise that can 
hamper the effectiveness of hybrid governance models (Lemos & 
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Agrawal, 2006). Hybrid urban regional governance can also adversely 
affect the quality of subnational democracy. It is true that involv-
ing private actors and implementing cooperative models can be 
a meaning ful addition to traditional representative democracy, 
but hybrid forms of governance often lack direct democratic legiti-
macy (Engel, 2001; Skelcher et al., 2013).
In the following section, we will evaluate four cases of hybrid 
urban regional governance from the perspectives of these two crite-
ria. These cases have been selected from countries that share similar 
state traditions (Rhineland and Nordic), whose predominant fea-
tures are that they have strong subnational governance institutions 
and are characterized by public-private cooperation, corporatism 
and consensus politics (Loughlin, Hendriks, & Lidström, 2011), 
This case-selection strategy aims to reduce the context sensitivity of 
our study. Within a broader set of potential cases, we selected cases 
that portray variety in terms of the degree and forms of hybrid-
ity. Based on a literature review, cases were selected from Berlin, 
Eindhoven, Copenhagen-Malmö and Zürich. The material that we 
used for our analysis includes academic literature, policy documents, 
interviews and ‘lab’ meetings with researchers and strategic policy-
makers from the four cities.
5.3 Four Cases of Hybrid Urban Regional Governance
5.3.1 Quartiersmanagement in the City-State of Berlin: A Multitude of 
Multilevel and Public-Private Relations
The first case is Berlin’s urban regional system of neighbourhood 
management, which is part of the Soziale Stadt Federal/Länder pro-
gramme (Bundesministerium für Verkehr, Bau und Stadtentwicklung 
[BMVBS], 2008) and is focused on countering socio-spatial segregation. 
The programme supports local activities through subsidies and strives 
to actively involve citizens in project management. This governance 
model can be considered mainly hybrid because private parties are not 
just hired by the Bundesland Berlin to organize citizen participation 
but are also expected to help develop and implement local policy in 
cooperation with residents.
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5.3.2 Brainport Eindhoven: A Triple-Helix Cooperation
Brainport Eindhoven is a typical example of a triple-helix structure, 
which features the business community, knowledge institutions 
and public authorities in the region cooperating as equal partners 
to further the regional innovation agenda, making it a characteristi-
cally hybrid mode of governance. The equal footing of the partners is 
expressed primarily in the Brainport Foundation, in which all parties 
are represented and that ultimately makes decisions about the regional 
development strategy (Schaap & Van Ostaaijen, 2015). Brainport 
Development, the private development company set up by the three 
partners, is a separate entity, which executes regional policies and 
whose major shareholders are the local municipalities.
5.3.3 Greater Copenhagen and Skåne Committee (GCSC): A Cross-Border 
Public Cooperation
The GCSC partnership in the Øresund region comprises three regions: 
two in Denmark (Hovedstaden and Sjælland) and one in Sweden 
(Skåne). It focuses on the joint marketing of the Greater Copenhagen 
region, developing a strong infrastructure in the region, attracting 
investors, tourists, companies and talents, and ensuring sustaina-
ble development (Greater Copenhagen & Skåne Committee [GCSC], 
2017). We consider this partnership hybrid because it transcends the 
territorial borders of the various governing agencies, as well as the 
public-private divide. All subnational government agencies from the 
three regions do indeed participate in the private-law partnership, 
which also involves private parties in setting up and carrying out 
specific projects. Moreover, a number of private and social parties are 
involved in the policy preparation process on an ad hoc basis.
5.3.4 Verein Metropolitanraum Zürich (VMZ): A Public Partnership in 
Private Form
The VMZ is a partnership that strives to coordinate policies in the field 
of regional economic development, transportation, society and spatial 
development (Nüssli, 2015). To this end, more than half of the regional 
government agencies participate in the association voluntarily, cur-
rently comprising around 120 cities and municipalities and eight 
cantons. Although the partnership is made up virtually exclusively of 
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public organizations, it can still be considered hybrid: The association 
is a private entity, is supported by a private secretariat and has a num-
ber of private affiliates. Moreover, there is also an outsourcing scheme 
that lets private parties submit project proposals to the association. 
The organization also features an – admittedly rather inactive – ‘echo 
chamber’ for social partners to reflect on the activities of the VMZ.
Table 1 contains an overview of the involvement of the various 
actors and the hybrid nature of the four models.
5.4 Effectiveness and Legitimacy of Hybrid Arrangements
If we measure these versatile governance models against the two main 
criteria of good governance proposed by Hendriks (2010), namely effec-
tiveness and legitimacy, we can establish that hybridity can be both 
a strength and a weakness and that the ultimate value of hybridity is 
highly dependent on its context.
5.4.1 Effectiveness
The effectiveness of cooperation in our four cases is influenced by vari-
ous factors. In Berlin, private parties are entrusted to implement public 
policies by means of an outsourcing scheme. This approach allows the 
city government to draw on private parties’ expertise in and experience 
with citizen participation and local development policy, which the city 
council does not have. As private parties develop local urban develop-
ment policies and citizen participation policies, they play a highly 
public role. In practice, however, locally developed policy frequently 
conflicts with the vision of the city council, which may detract from 
the effectiveness of the implementation process. In addition, the pri-
vate Quartiermanagers are frequently forced to ask themselves whether 
they represent the interests of their client (the city council) or those 
of local residents. In its capacity as a hybrid organization, it is hard to 
classify the Quartiersmanagement. As one respondent puts it, “They 
don’t really belong anywhere.”
Matters are significantly different in the metropolitan Brainport 
partnership in the Eindhoven area. Here, private parties, knowl-
edge institutions and public authorities serve as equal partners in 
the development of strategic regional policy, while the private-law 
entity (the foundation) allows them to make strategic agreements 
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among themselves. The implementation of these agreements is then 
entrusted to Brainport Development, the associated development 
company, which has major implementation capacity at its disposal. 
This form of governance is considered highly effective in the field 
of economic development and innovation. Brainport Development’s 
affiliation to the foundation and the fact that its principal share-
holders are municipalities generally ensure that it has sufficient 
political commitment in the eyes of those involved. Simultaneously, 
however, classical agency problems arise in the sense that policy 
implementation in Brainport Development is not always a direct 
translation of the strategic policy determined by the foundation.
Unlike Brainport, the governance model of the GCSC relies on 
decentralized implementation capacity, which municipalities are 
expected to provide themselves. The decision to organize the GCSC 
in such a way was prompted by recent experiences: the predecessor 
of the GCSC, the Øresund Committee, did have considerable imple-
mentation capacity at its disposal within the organization itself. For 
that reason, however, it gradually detached itself from the participat-
ing municipalities, thus losing the necessary political commitment. 
The new organizational form has proved its worth with initiatives 
such as a mobility charter, but it lacks the structural involvement 
and embedding of social and private parties.
In Zürich, there are considerable doubts with regard to the useful-
ness of said involvement. In the constitutional context of Switzerland, 
with its three administrative layers (federal, cantonal and municipal) 
and highly decentralized autonomy, the VMZ has emphatically opted 
against cooperating on strategic regional policies with private and 
social parties. Stakeholders indicate that there is hardly any room 
for such cooperation owing to the perceived primacy of politics. 
Alternative forms of hybridity can be found, however, such as in the 
private secretariat, which is capable of action that is more politically 
neutral, and in the outsourcing scheme that lets private and social 
parties submit project proposals. This lets the organization “stay in 
touch with what is going on outside public organisations”, a state-
ment various respondents supported. At the same time, the VMZ can 
hardly be said, from a governance point of view, to produce binding 
strategic policymaking, as the private entity underlying the volun-
tary partnership provides few anchors for binding policy.
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5.4.2 Legitimacy
Hybrid forms of governance inherently raise questions of legitimacy. 
After all, whereas public organizations in the traditional system of 
representative democracy can typically rely on direct democratic 
legitimacy through elections, this rarely applies to hybrid forms of 
governance, which often lack the democratic means that let third par-
ties provide direct or indirect input or effectively call the participating 
public organizations to account. For this reason, we will now examine 
whether and how the four governance models deal with the issue of 
legitimacy.
In Berlin, traditional, top-down representative democracy is sup-
plemented with grass-roots democracy through the role played by 
citizens and civil society organizations in decision-making processes, 
thus ensuring a twofold safeguard of democratic legitimacy. This can 
lead to tensions between the various mandates, but, from the per-
spective of democratic legitimacy, that is not necessarily a bad thing. 
After all, clashes can trigger discussions about what the public inter-
est is and who represent it (Hendriks, 2010).
In Eindhoven, the challenge of democratic legitimacy applies 
mainly to the individual, smaller municipalities, as there is often 
uncertainty as to the extent they can actually influence and con-
tribute to the development of Brainport and whether effective 
accountability mechanisms are in place. After all, the hybrid nature 
of the partnership means that it is somewhat detached from the deci-
sion-making process in municipal councils. However, the fact that 
the Eindhoven region is considered successful means that any dis-
cussion about its legitimacy is often nipped in the bud. In this sense, 
the output legitimacy of Brainport appears to be more developed than 
its input legitimacy. At the same time, Brainport’s strategy reveals 
it is working to make the region ‘more inclusive’, shifting from a 
triple-helix to a multi-helix governance model and, among other 
measures, seeking to involve citizens in the partnership (Brainport 
Development, 2015). In the practical implementation of this new strat-
egy, however, citizens seem to be regarded primarily as end users of 
technological innovations rather than as participants in the decision- 
making process.
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The GCSC does not involve citizens in its decision-making pro-
cesses either, which means that the organization’s democratic 
legitimacy, based mainly on indirect legitimization through the 
municipal councils and mayors, is considered one of its weaknesses. 
However, this is not seen as a particularly important or urgent 
problem, partly because the regional partnership has succeeded in 
influencing national authorities on a number of occasions. Once more, 
output legitimacy is considered to outweigh input  legitimacy.
In Zürich, the output legitimacy of the organization is primarily 
safeguarded by indirect representation through the executive politi-
cians of the municipalities and cantons representing the residents of 
these areas. All the same, a number of stakeholders highlight the fact 
that the VMZ rarely accounts for its actions to the municipalities and 
cantons as a threat to its legitimacy (see also Schwab, Kübler, & Walti, 
2001).
This leads to the overview of solutions and identified risks repre-
sented in Table 2.
Table 2 Effectiveness and legitimacy of the four cases
City regions Assessment criteria
Effectiveness Legitimacy
Quartiers-
management 
Berlin
+   recruiting specific 
expertise
−  clashing mandates
+  combination of 
represen tative and 
participative democracy
Brainport 
 Eindhoven
+   joined strengths of 
 private, societal and 
public parties
+  strong implementation 
organization with polit-
ical commitment
−  agency problems
−  successful cooperation 
silences discussion 
about legitimacy issues
−  little direct involvement 
of municipal councils
Greater Copen-
hagen and Skåne 
Committee
+/−   local organization 
of implementation 
 capacity
−  minimal role played 
by private and societal 
parties
−  successful cooperation 
silences discussion 
about legitimacy issues
−  indirect legitimation
Verein Metro-
politanraum 
Zürich
+  coalition of the willing
−  hardly any specific 
policy making
−  indirect legitimation 
and scant accountability
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5.5 Comparative Discussion
In all four cases, we can see that regional authorities are looking for 
governance models that are both effective and fit for the purpose of the 
organization. Hybridity is a recurring element in these models that has 
the aim of increasing the problem-solving capacity of the government 
by linking public, private and societal actors and by combining public 
and private legal, administrative and organizational features. In each of 
the cases, hybridity takes a different shape. Whereas Brainport opted 
for a triple-helix approach, the VMZ considers such a form possibly 
desirable yet unfeasible based on the importance of local autonomy and 
the primacy of politics. Small-scale, voluntary inter-municipality coop-
eration therefore seems to be one of the rare ways to achieve a form 
of regional governance in this area (Plüss & Schenkel, 2014). Within 
this structure, those involved are looking to implement elements of 
hybrid governance to stay connected to society. The GCSC is still look-
ing for a solution as well: those involved recognize the importance of 
including private parties but have thus far not managed to achieve 
much more than ad hoc involvement at a relatively low level. As a con-
sequence, the public logic remains rather dominant in the GCSC. 
The same applies in Berlin, where the governance model works with 
an out sourcing scheme in which the private partners are sometimes 
referred to as ‘the lengthened arm of the Senate’, signalling a strong 
shadow of hierarchy. This label, however, does not do full justice to 
the hybrid nature of this form of governance, which involves a private 
party develop ing public policy while also bearing the responsibility to 
involve citizens. Nevertheless, it does lead to clashing mandates and 
questions about the role played by hybrid intermediary organizations 
such as the Quartiersmanagement, thereby limiting the effectiveness of 
this governance model at times. The hybrid character of the local mode 
of governance is also a strength, however, because it affords the organ-
ization the flexibility of a private party in implementing public policy. 
Moreover, the legitimacy of Quartiersmanagement is safeguarded 
relatively well, owing partly to the scale of the system and partly to the 
approach taken. In the three other urban regions, output legitimacy 
is generally considered to outweigh input legitimacy, especially if the 
latter were to be achieved through direct citizen involvement. In Berlin, 
however, policymakers are convinced that the effectiveness of policy 
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stands or falls on its legitimacy (see also Hendriks, 2010). The other 
three urban regions do not share this conviction to a similar extent and 
do not experience the legitimacy problem inherent in hybrid systems 
in the same way. Nevertheless, Brainport and the GCSC, as well as the 
VMZ in Zürich to a lesser extent, are looking to connect with citizens, 
companies and civil society organizations in ways that go beyond 
the current approach. As of now, however, these attempts are not very 
effective, as is shown by Brainport’s unconvincing approach to the 
idea of a multi-helix system and Zürich’s attempt to keep a reflection 
group composed of civil society organizations alive. At the same time, 
new initiatives to find fitting forms of hybrid governance are springing 
up in both regions, such as the programme that opens an opportunity 
for Zürich’s citizens and civil society to submit project proposals, and 
the intention of organizing ‘future labs’ that will let societal actors 
play their part in thinking about the future of the urban region. 
Such initiatives are yet to prove their worth, however.
5.6 Conclusion
Each of the four urban regions is looking for effective, legitimate 
forms of urban regional governance that fit the local context, using 
hybridity as an instrument to increase their problem-solving capac-
ity. In this endeavour, output legitimacy is frequently considered to 
outweigh input legitimacy, which is to say that the results achieved by 
the urban regional authorities for the local economy and community 
are valued more highly than the question of whether representatives 
of that community can influence or be involved with decision-making 
in the urban region. The latter is traditionally guaranteed through 
representatives elected by the people, and the perception that repre-
sentative democracy remains the only source of democratic legitimacy 
is relatively dominant in all four urban regions, with the partial excep-
tion of Brainport. Simultaneously, however, representative bodies 
often play a rather marginal role in the governance structures that we 
have analysed. Another way to boost input legitimacy could be to let 
citizens and/or representatives of community interests play a part in 
articulating society’s preferences. The former is especially prominent 
in the rhetoric of the four urban regions, apart from Berlin, where cit-
izens can actually exert influence in various roles. There is, however, 
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a clear search for fruitful connections between the urban regional 
governance and societal parties, which looks slightly different in each 
urban region. In this respect, there is still much to be improved: private 
parties are currently involved on a rather selective and unilateral basis 
and are rarely given the chance to exert real influence (with the excep-
tion of Brainport Eindhoven). The latter is mainly due to the normative 
perspective of representative democracy. Put sharply, the legitimacy of 
urban regional governance is hardly ever called into question, and the 
people involved assume that they can rely on the support of the exist-
ing representative bodies.
Finding hybrid forms of governance that combine public and pri-
vate logics to increase not just the effectiveness of the region but also 
its legitimacy remains a key challenge for practitioners. They will 
have to look for alternative sources of legitimacy, as relying on the 
involvement of existing elected representatives alone may be risky. 
After all, elections are already not a perfect way to communicate and 
translate societal preferences, and this is even a bigger problem when 
there are no elections at all, as in our four cases of urban regional 
gover nance. Urban regional governance offers an interesting oppor-
tunity to societalize democracy, as this is exactly where it is both 
possible and useful to give representatives of societal interests (per 
issue or policy domain) an influential role to play. These representa-
tives will contribute more than just knowledge and insight: They will 
provide social support. This may just be a truly essential criterion of 
good or smart urban regional governance: adaptively joining public 
and private forces and logics for addressing specific challenges in 
effective, sustainable, feasible and legitimate ways.
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Chapter 6 
The Dynamics of New 
Governance Arrangements for 
Sustainable Value Chains*1 
Katrien Termeer, Hilde Toonen, Marcel Kok and Esther Turnhout
Traditional state-centred governance systems have failed to tackle 
effectively the transnational problem of the sustainability of global 
value chains (GVCs). To fill this institutional void, industry and 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) established a series of global 
partnerships that designed standards and certification schemes for 
global commodities. This chapter uses various theoretical lenses 
to address the question of the extent to which these arrangements 
can be considered intelligent and for what and for whom they are 
 beneficial. Despite their relative success, these partnerships face some 
serious challenges. All key players recognize these challenges and 
have developed abundant initiatives to learn and adapt, varying from 
landscape certification and public standards to advanced traceability 
systems and harmonizing programmes. These innovations, how-
ever, are constrained by the boundaries of the current system and its 
underlying assumptions.
6.1 Introduction
You will struggle to find a chocolate product without the UTZ logo in 
supermarkets, a lot of wooden garden furniture features the FSC label, 
and consumers have started eating more and more MSC-certified fish. 
* This chapter is part of the NWO Smart Governance programme. A word of 
thanks to Henk Gilhuis and Mark van Oorschot for their comments on earlier 
versions.
86
Behind these small symbols lies a whole world full of new governance 
arrangements aimed at making global value chains more sustainable 
and equitable. It is a world of voluntary standards, labels, round tables 
and self-governance, in which the role of governments is very limited.
Many public management scholars have written about new 
governance concepts that would be better able to deal with wicked 
problems such as the sustainability of global value chains than tra-
ditional, monocentric, top-down governance arrangements (Hood, 
1991; Kooiman, 2003; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; Rhodes, 1996; Torfing, 
Peters, Pierre, & Sørensen, 2012). At first glance, these certification 
systems and private partnerships seem to be a good example of such 
new arrangements. This chapter uses various theoretical lenses to 
address the question of the extent to which these arrangements can 
be considered smart and for what and for whom they are beneficial.
6.2 The Emergence of Voluntary Sustainability Standards and 
the Organizations Behind Them
The globalization of our economy means that agricultural resources 
and products, such as wood, coffee, tea, cocoa, fruit, palm oil and 
fish, are now travelling around the world to an ever-increasing extent. 
Western countries consume a vast number of products that are pro-
duced in developing countries, where they cause a wide range of 
sustainability problems, including deforestation, overexploitation, 
loss of bio diversity, poor working conditions, child labour, air pol-
lution and land grabbing. International companies can source their 
raw materials wherever they want, and there is little that national 
governments can do to stop them. The reasons governments give for 
their inability to step in range from respect for the sovereignty of other 
countries and commitment to rules for free global trade set by the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) to the limited regulatory power of 
international organizations.
In the 1980s, the inability of national governments and interna-
tional organizations to take action began to draw increasing criticism 
(Glasbergen, 2008; Hall & Biersteker, 2003). Non-governmental 
 organizations (NGOs) concluded that their strategy of applying pres-
sure on governments was not very effective. With no desire to wait 
any longer, they initiated the development of voluntary sustainability 
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standards, attempting to fill an institutional void by creating new 
rules (Hajer, 2003). These new governance arrangements are based on 
a theory of change and include the following mechanisms (Steering 
Committee of the State-of-Knowledge Assessment of Standards and 
Certification [SCSKASC], 2012). First of all, farmers and other private 
producers’ companies in the value chain decide to start complying 
voluntarily with sustainability standards, which are drawn up in 
cooperation with civil society organizations (Cashore, 2002; Gereffi, 
Humphrey, & Sturgeon, 2005). Subsequently, the parties involved 
set up systems to monitor whether production meets the criteria 
imposed by these standards and is therefore eligible for certification 
(Cook, van Bommel, Turnhout, 2016). Certified products are then 
made known to consumers by means of visible labels, giving them 
the opportunity to opt for (more) sustainable products and, above 
all, pay more for them. Finally, it is expected that other parties in 
the chain, such as supermarkets or the food processing industry, 
will start to anticipate this consumer behaviour by purchasing and 
processing certified products. In a competitive market, the  initiators 
of sustainability standards hope that more producers will start to 
comply with the standards as it would bring them a competitive 
advantage and, finally, more income.
The Max Havelaar label, dedicated to equitable, sustainably pro-
duced coffee, was one of the first such initiatives and was introduced 
by the development-oriented NGO Solidaridad in 1988, before con-
tinuing as an independent standards organization whose primary 
activities are implementing quality systems. Many followed this 
example, as similar initiatives were launched in many Western coun-
tries. In 1993, the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) was established 
by a group of environmental NGOs with the aim of effecting more 
responsible forest management (Gulbrandsen, 2009; Schepers, 2010). 
Although the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) was the key architect of the 
FSC, more activist organizations such as Greenpeace and Friends of 
the Earth put pressure on major players in the timber supply chain to 
commit to this initiative. In 1996, the WWF and Unilever joined forces 
to establish the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) for sustainable 
fisheries. The FSC is a membership organization, but the MSC opted 
against this format as early experiences had shown that it hampered 
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the effectiveness of the FSC (Gulbrandsen, 2009). In addition, the MSC 
focuses specifically on ecological issues, whereas the FSC explicitly 
strives to strike a balance between environmental, social and eco-
nomic interests.
With the arrival of the new millennium, organizations turned 
to the round table concept. At the global sustainability summit in 
Johannesburg (2002), these partnerships were formally recognized 
as good alternatives to governmental regulation (Glasbergen, 2008). 
Examples include the Round Table for Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO, 
founded in 2003) or the Sustainable Beef Roundtable (SBR, founded 
in 2010). These round tables are global multi-stakeholder platforms 
whose aim is to improve the sustainability and equity of an entire 
agricultural chain (Schouten, 2013). Dozens of private parties and 
NGOs, from both producing and consuming countries, take part in 
these round tables, which ultimately rely primarily on standards and 
product certification schemes (Schouten, 2013).
New organizations were also created in response to existing 
initiatives, such as UTZ, which was founded in 2002 by the Dutch 
multinational Ahold and a Guatemalan coffee producer. This new 
organization formed an alternative to the Max Havelaar quality 
label, which had been developed mainly for smaller coffee farm-
ers and cooperatives. Medium-sized and major coffee producers 
could not apply for this certificate (Inglenbeek & Reinders, 2013). 
Rather than carrying out audits themselves, a number of standards 
organizations have chosen to have their standards monitored by 
accredited, independent auditors. In addition, a number of standards 
organizations jointly founded the Alliance for International Social 
and Environmental  Accreditation and Labelling (ISEAL), which 
develops Codes of Conduct for designing, auditing and evaluat-
ing standards (van Oorschot, 2014). As a consequence, an entirely 
new infra structure of standards and certification has emerged, 
forming a breeding ground for the introduction of new standards 
(van Oorschot, 2014).
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6.3 Voluntary Sustainability Standards as Mixed Forms of 
Governance
In this section, we examine the extent to which Voluntary 
Sustainability Standards (VSSs) reflect current thinking about new 
governance arrangements. First, they are based on many ideas of neo-
liberalism and New Public Management (NPM) (Mert, 2012). The central 
idea of these lines of thought is that the effectiveness and efficiency 
of policies and public services can be improved by entrusting these 
responsibilities to the market (private parties) and managing what 
remains of the public sector in a business-like manner. Key princi-
ples are market forces, entrepreneurship, privatization, performance 
orien tation and SMART indicators: Specific, Measurable, Achievable, 
Realistic and Time-bound (Hood, 1991; Rhodes, 1996). The certification 
systems are based on the notion that market parties are able to regulate 
themselves and that they can guide market supply and demand pro-
cesses in a more sustainable direction by developing, monitoring and 
communicating explicit SMART performance standards. These private 
arrangements also conform to the optimistic idea that companies can 
offer a counterweight to the shortcomings of governments (Schouten, 
2013). Standards organizations and round tables make the deliberate 
decision not to invite governments to be founding partners or mem-
bers, although governments do play a facilitating role, in line with the 
NPM philosophy of steering, not rowing. The Dutch government, for 
instance, contributed to facilitating and subsidizing round tables and 
certification organizations (van Oorschot, 2014).
Second, round tables and other certification initiatives represent 
practical examples of theoretical ideas about collaborative gover-
nance (Huxham & Vangen, 2005) and network governance (Koppenjan 
& Klijn, 2004). The dominant philosophy behind this type of gover-
nance is that uniting mutually dependent actors can contribute 
to the development of innovative forms of social problem-solving. 
Both in the round tables and in other standards organizations, the 
decision was made to strive for creating new partnerships between 
private companies and civil society organizations that had been 
 diametrically opposed in the past. Rather than organizing boycotts 
and shame campaigns aimed at market parties, development and 
environmental NGOs sought reconciliation, trying to coax companies 
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to pay more attention to environmental and social considerations by 
ways that fitted into their business models (Humphrey & Schmitz, 
2002; Tallontire, 2007). With professional facilitators and process 
managers at the helm (Schouten, 2013), growing understanding 
emerged about mutual differences in vision, as well as the awareness 
that there is no overall definition for the complex range of sustaina-
bility issues.
Finally, these governance arrangements are in line with informa-
tional governance, which means that information and information 
systems play a prominent role in sustainable development in the 
digital age (Mol, 2006). The problems in global value chains were 
particularly persistent because the adverse environmental and social 
effects in production countries remained invisible for companies and 
consumers elsewhere. This information, however, is now disclosed by 
the labels and the associated information systems. Because consum-
ers must be able to trace back sustainability claims made on a label 
to an individual producer, increasingly advanced  traceability sys-
tems have been developed to make product flows and their impacts 
visible. This allows consumers to hold producers accountable, thus 
motivating them to improve their performance (Turnhout, Neves, 
& De Lijster, 2014). Especially in the digital age, trust in these sys-
tems is crucial. Development charities and environmental NGOs 
wield significant influence when it comes to building (and destroy-
ing) companies’ reputation capital (Glasbergen, 2008; Mol, 2008). 
Moreover, these civil society organizations increasingly face account-
ability pressures and the need to demonstrate that they are no part of 
any greenwashing attempt.
6.4 Beneficial for Whom and for What?
Given the previous reflections, we could describe these VSSs as a smart 
way to organize the governance of sustainable value chains. However, 
that would be a simplistic conclusion and one that fails to do justice 
to the raging critical debates about these private governance arrange-
ments. Key questions remain: from what perspective do we call a 
particular arrangement intelligent or smart, and for whom or for what 
purpose is it beneficial?
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Within the NPM philosophy, effectiveness and (market) efficiency 
are the most important criteria for assessing whether something 
is smart. In that respect, most standards can be considered reasonably 
successful. After a long period of minor niche markets for conscious 
consumers, the market share of certified products has jumped con-
siderably since 2000, although it is still less than 20% (van Oorschot, 
2014). It must be said, however, that this applies mainly to their 
market share in Europe and North America (van Oorschot, 2014). 
However, the expectation that consumers are willing to pay a higher 
price for products, thereby supporting producers, small holders in 
particular, often fails to come to fruition. As a consequence, it is 
often too expensive, and therefore inefficient, for small holders in 
developing countries to apply for certification. In poorer countries, 
small-scale farmers and fishermen simply cannot meet the criteria 
for certification because they do not have the knowledge or financial 
means to make the necessary adjustments, the costs involved in the 
certification process are too high and the revenues are too little (Bush, 
Toonen, Oosterveer, & Mol, 2013).
In neoliberal and collaborative views on governance, the shift from 
government to market governance is generally characterized as a 
positive, and therefore smart, development. However, this shift is not 
beneficial for everyone and for all goals. Schouten (2013), for instance, 
addresses the inherent threat of colonization of the arrangements by 
market parties. Companies will take part in such arrangements only 
if they can see a sound business case; and because round tables and 
standards organizations want to ensure that major market parties 
remain committed, they will typically be willing to accommodate 
the interests of these parties to keep them on board (Cashore, 2002). 
As a result, some groups will be put in a privileged position, leading 
to an unequal balance of power. The active participation of NGOs in 
these partnerships is not always enough to guarantee inclusivity and 
equality (Hospes, Dewulf, & Falling, 2016). Besides, the fact that these 
private arrangements will inevitably also have to deal with govern-
ment policy is frequently overlooked. It is striking, for instance, that 
certification schemes in developing countries are successful primar-
ily in countries with well-functioning governments (van Oorschot, 
2014). Because certification is not mandatory, companies are free to 
92
focus on the legal regulations in their country, which generally has 
considerably less stringent standards. As long as there remains a large 
market for non-certified products, sustainability will continue to 
depend on capricious market dynamics (Schouten, 2013).
In recent years, the awareness that private and public actors can 
help each other to realize sustainability ambitions has grown in 
Western countries (Gulbrandsen, 2014). The Dutch government, for 
instance, gave financial support to fishermen looking to be certified, 
and also modified its own procurement policy. In production coun-
tries, the relationship between producers and governments is often 
more difficult, as voluntary standards are frequently regarded as a 
form of paternalism or as a competitor of government policy. The 
Indonesian government, for example, has decided to develop its own 
standard in response to the RSPO: the I(Indonesian)SPO (Hospes, 
2014). We could consider this healthy policy competition, as it is 
plausible that countries would not have acted if they had not been 
prompted to do so by voluntary standards. However, the criteria for 
sustainability and social justice included in these government stand-
ards are often less strict than the voluntary standards (Hospes, 2014).
Governance based on advanced information systems is often per-
ceived as a form of smart governance. Again, however, there is some 
room for criticism, as it is ultimately unclear who pays for the infor-
mation systems, who profits from them and what risks they entail 
(Mol, 2006). With the emergence of complex traceability systems, 
auditing organizations and organizations that audit the auditors, a 
private bureaucracy has emerged. Questions can be asked whether 
this private bureaucracy is actually more efficient than government 
regulation. In addition to stimulating the production, trade and 
consumption of certified products, sustainability certificates have 
become tradable products themselves, and it is even possible to spec-
ulate with them. The increased focus on product flow visibility has 
also launched a lucrative new market for traceability technologies. 
This sector is vulnerable to cybersecurity issues and hidden forms 
of data mining and data trading. The standards organizations, for 
instance, owe their position of power to their central position in 
the web of collecting, processing, communicating and providing 
feedback on sustainability information (Mol, 2006; Soma, Termeer, 
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& Opdam, 2016; Toonen, 2013). The growing certification market 
requires that additional attention be paid to sound checks and bal-
ances in the information chain.
The dominance of governance theories based on market orien-
tations, partnerships and disclosure of information has a major 
influence on how these private governance arrangements are 
assessed, but ultimately a governance arrangement can be considered 
truly successful only if it solves actual sustainability problems. This 
is where a number of key questions arise. Thus far, certification has 
worked out well primarily for companies that were already behaving 
in a quite sustainable way (Pattberg, 2005) and for chains in which 
companies could reasonably easily meet auditing and traceability 
requirements. This is one of the reasons why the increased market 
share of certified products has led to only a relatively limited decrease 
in deforestation or child labour, for instance (Franssen & Kolk, 2007).
6.5 Towards Better Governance
When they were first created, private governance arrangements were 
innovative and succeeded in making a breakthrough after a long-term 
lock-in. Nowadays, they have become mainstream, and all sorts of 
side effects, such as those described earlier, have become more visible. 
These problems are not new, and most round tables and standards 
organizations are familiar with them. Although it is important for 
these organizations that they have a large and growing market share, 
their raison d’être is based on solving environmental problems and 
combating social injustice in supply chains. In doing so, they are 
also working on improving private governance arrangements, thus 
 making them even smarter. Various attempts have been made to 
develop 2.0 certification systems, for instance, with a heavy invest-
ment in research into impact. In addition to focusing on vertically 
organized value chains, these organizations have started adopting 
a landscape approach, which aims to make areas more sustainable and 
allows more groups to benefit while reducing the effects of passing on 
costs (Arts et al., 2017; Deans, Ros-Tonen, & Derkyi, 2018). In order to 
shed their Western image, these organizations dedicate considerable 
resources to gain access to markets in emerging countries such as 
China, India and Brazil (Schleifer, 2017). In addition, they are search-
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ing for hybrid forms of public and private governance (Kløcker Larsen 
et al., 2018). Various standards organizations, for instance, are build-
ing new coalitions with governments to generate synergy between 
governmental policies and private initiatives. Companies that use the 
standards have also started calling for government regulations to level 
out the playing field (Brack and Wolosin, 2018). In the process, however, 
they once again encounter the age-old political obstacles of free global 
trade.
Although the private governance arrangements have been shown 
to act adaptively and dynamically in various areas, the question is 
whether this will suffice. All current changes are still made within 
the same old frameworks, in which certification is the model for 
sustainable supply chains and market efficiency the norm. This is 
becoming a particularly prominent risk in the light of increasing 
calls for the sustainable development of supply chains to be driven by 
more than just voluntary standards and certification (van Oorschot, 
2014). Most standards organizations and round tables are innovative 
but only within existing systems. The question is whether they are 
also capable of radical transformation. The high levels of investment 
in the infrastructure of standards, certificates and traceability has 
led to path dependencies that may block arrangements that go beyond 
these private certification systems.
6.6 Conclusion
This chapter examined the extent to which private governance arrange-
ments are a smart way of enhancing the sustainability of global value 
chains. These arrangements consist of partnerships between business 
actors and NGOs that initiate round tables to agree on standards and 
implement them by means of certification and labelling. When they 
first emerged, these private governance arrangements for the sustain-
able and equitable development of value chains were certainly a smart 
way of dealing with the problem at hand. They managed to break 
through a long-term lock-in situation, where governments were un -
able to tackle transnational sustainability issues. They also exhibited a 
hybrid of contemporary governance philosophies, such as NPM, collab-
orative governance and informational governance. However, these 
arrangements have turned out not to be beneficial for everyone and for 
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every goal and are now facing several new challenges. The underlying 
theory of change failed to fulfil all its promises: The market-driven 
uptake of certified products is disappointing and small holders hardly 
share in the benefits. Actors are aware of these challenges, though, 
and are constantly working to improve the arrangements and to learn 
more. The first signs of a new generation of arrangements for sustain-
able value chains, such as landscape approaches, cooperation with 
certification systems from production countries or experiments with 
blockchain technology, have also emerged. However, the investment of 
considerable resources in the current partnerships, labels and the asso-
ciated traceability systems has created a path dependence that could 
hinder more radical change.
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ON SMART HYBRIDITY
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Chapter 7 
Integration and Needed 
Capacities for Hybrid 
Governance Arrangements
Kirk Emerson
The studies presented in Part 1 of this book investigate a broad array 
of new hybrid systems for governing complex, cross-boundary chal-
lenges, from Internet platforms to public/private contracting to more 
client- centred public health planning and delivery, regional partner-
ships and private certification of supply chains for sustainability. 
The book’s valuable illustrations and insights lead me to reflect more 
broadly on a new, emerging role for public administration as well as 
the needed capacities for those working in public service – be they 
government, private, non-profit or citizen actors. It also suggests 
some critical questions for future research.
Across the case studies and throughout the commentary, the cross- 
boundary nature of these new hybrid governance arrangements is 
fully evident, be it connecting sectors, governance mechanisms or 
policy approaches. These actors are creating systems that do not 
simply cross divides, but also change the nature of those divides by 
knitting them together into new hybrid governing patterns. They are 
integrating institutions, organizational cultures, expertise, knowl-
edge and skills, resources, perspectives and interests. The demands 
of cross-boundary wicked policy problems and the corresponding 
rise of interorganizational networks and collaborative governance 
all require proactive integration across sectors, scales, problem sets, 
disciplinary knowledge and expertise.
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At the ‘Minnowbrook at 50’ workshop sponsored by Syracuse 
University in 2018, integration emerged as a key theme in the 
 discussions about the future direction of public administration 
(Carboni et al., forthcoming). The professional field of public adminis-
tration in the United States arose through efforts to distinguish and 
separate itself from politics, lay knowledge and public sentiment. 
In the last few decades, however, we have seen the development 
of a new role and function for public managers and decision mak-
ers, that is, that of integrators. Working in more open and publicly 
accountable settings, they are engaging in more dynamic interactions 
with organized stakeholders and the public at large as well as with 
the organizations (non-profit and private) that are participating in 
public service delivery and resource management. Public admin-
istrators are in a unique position to integrate these actors, work in 
inter disciplinary and applied spaces and make progress on complex, 
wicked policy dilemmas.
This new integrative role requires new governing capacities for 
those in public service – be they government, private, non-profit 
or citizen actors (Bingham, Nabatchi, & O’Leary, 2005; Klijn & 
Koppenjan, 2016). I would like to touch on three of these needed 
capacities that are mentioned throughout this book but deserve fur-
ther attention as we prepare students, professionals and citizens to 
play these integrative roles in hybrid governance systems. The first 
capacity builds on the repeated observation that hybrid arrangements 
need to find the right fit or alignment with existing structures of gov-
ernment, the market, non-profit organizations and citizen advocacy 
as well as with the public service challenge or public policy dilemma. 
Finding the right fit requires intentional assessment of the situation, 
the potential actors and their involvement and the strategic choices 
around options for structuring, initiating and managing these new 
fora. These considerations require a design sensibility and orien-
tation. The innovators of new hybrid governing arrangements are 
innovative governance designers, and more attention should be paid 
to cultivating design capacities and mindsets.
The second capacity I would like to underscore is conflict 
manage ment. While conflict among actors or within communi-
ties to be served was mentioned in the book, the emphasis is on the 
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constructive functions of coordination, consultation and collab-
oration. If, indeed, the essence of these new governing systems is 
to reveal or serve public values, transparency, inclusion and trust 
among them, inevitably conflicts among diverse actors will emerge 
(O’Leary, 2015). Indeed, any efforts to suppress them will surely 
undermine any collec tive enterprise. The successful new governance 
pioneers possess, whether from training, experience and/or per-
sonality, the capacity to acknowledge and handle interpersonal and 
interorganizational conflict. They are adept at respecting divergent 
viewpoints, managing differences and mediating among contentious 
perspectives, interests and/or deeply held values. Moving forward, 
as demands for hybridity grow, we will need to cultivate conflict 
management skill sets through training, mentoring and elevating 
their value and contribution to the new governance arena.
The third capacity needs little introduction but perhaps more 
acknowledgement than provided for by the empirical studies in this 
volume. The leadership roles and requirements of hybrid governance 
arrangements are varied and multifaceted. Initiating leadership is 
seen as an essential driver of the formation of collaborative gover-
nance regimes (Emerson, Nabatchi, & Balogh, 2012; Emerson & 
Nabatchi, 2015), for example, but equally important is the leadership 
manifest in every participant in a hybrid system. Each actor brings 
some form of formal or informal power and capacity to the table as 
they represent their home organization, constituency or network. 
One might think of a leadership matrix within a hybrid governance 
arrangement. A self-reinforcing, committed leadership matrix may 
be one of the most critical conditions for successful performance. 
Much has been written on the essentials of collaborative leadership 
and on public leadership in collaborations (Crosby & Bryson, 2010; 
Klijn, 2014; Sørensen & Torfing, 2016). Much more will be required of 
the academy and other training institutions to prepare and support 
leaders from all sectors for the challenges these new governance 
arrangements face.
Turning to the future research agenda, I would like to call out two 
sets of research questions that are currently on my mind. The first 
centres on how these hybrid arrangements unfold in different 
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 govern ing contexts. What do hybrid arrangements look like in 
strong state settings such as China, or in more fragmented states 
like India or in disruptive settings of political polarization as in the 
United States? Where the social contract with the state is strongest, 
as in the Netherlands and in Scandinavian countries, is govern-
ment’s role in hybrid governance different than in more contested 
or emergent democratic regimes? Experiments with collaborative 
governance regimes and other hybrid forms of governance are play-
ing out around the globe. Soon we will have many more case studies 
to analyse and compare performance under different conditions 
concerning the role of the state, the distribution of power across 
actors, the ‘voluntariness’ of participation and the nature of trust and 
accountability in public decision-making.
Another set of questions address the temporal nature of these 
govern ing experiments in governance. What will these cases look like 
in 5 to 10 years? Will they tend to formalize into interorganizational 
institutions, as some research would suggest (Isett, Mergel, LeRoux, 
Mischen, & Rethemeyer, 2011)? More broadly, will the rise of hybrid 
governance indeed change the nature of formal government into 
more responsive, integrative enablers? Will they assist in restoring 
trust in government as constructive participants and supporters of 
new governing models? Or will civil society tire of the demanding 
responsibilities of partnering with the state to deliver public serv ices 
and solve public policy challenges? Or will new sources of invest-
ment (from private sources, public contracts, user fees or taxes) ari se 
to underwrite the ongoing costs of sustaining hybrid governance 
arrangements? Will integrative change agents professionalize or 
create more third-party convening/hosting organizations to serve as 
facilitators or network managers? All these and other inquiries will, 
hopefully, prompt the next volume in this ongoing investigation into 
new governance arrangements.
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Chapter 8 
Collaborative Governance 
Arrangements in Theory and 
Practice
Michael Howlett
Proposals for different kinds of collaboration can be thought of as 
efforts to shift governance styles between different modes of govern-
ing (Treib, Bahr, & Falkner, 2007), and the chapters in this volume 
address the many challenges associated with these transitions.
Unfortunately, the history of many such transition efforts is replete 
with false starts and over-optimistic expectations. Initially, for 
example, the sentiment behind many governance reform efforts 
and coalitions in the 1980s and 1990s favoured transitions from 
govern ment-led service design and delivery, and regulation, to more 
market-based governance regimes with efforts at privatization and 
deregulation occurring in many countries and sectors. Sometimes 
these were accomplished successfully but oftentimes they were not.
In recent years, the tilt has shifted towards transitions to the more 
network-oriented collaborative governance relationships described 
in this volume. Many proponents claim these forms of ‘collaborative 
governance’ potentially combine the best of both government- and 
market-based arrangements by bringing together key public and 
private actors in a policy sector in a constructive and inexpensive 
way (Koffijberg, De Bruijn, & Priemus, 2012). But poor definitions and 
poor theorization continue to plague many accounts of collaboration 
in which otherwise dissimilar governance efforts are often clumped 
under the same rubric and their nuances and differences ignored.
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Many ‘collaborative’ governance arrangements (Ansell & 
Gash, 2008), in fact, are prescribed without knowing exactly what 
they are and under what conditions they are likely to succeed or fail. 
That is, when governments reform or try to shift from one mode to 
another, they need to understand not only the nature of the problem 
they are trying to address and the skills and resources they have at 
their disposal to do so but, especially, the innate features of each 
potential governance mode and the capabilities and competences 
each requires in order to operate at a high level of performance 
(Howlett & Ramesh, 2016). If these capacity concerns are not taken 
into account, then any short-term gain enjoyed by deploying a hybrid 
collaborative governance technique is likely to be cancelled out later 
on when the consequences of policy failures and poor institutional 
design become apparent.
Co-production, for example, is a short-hand term for a variety of 
governance arrangements that involve citizens in the production and 
delivery of public services (Pestoff, Brandsen, & Verschuere, 2012). 
It has long been recognized that expectations of free labour from 
co-producers may not materialize, however, and schemes to incentiv-
ize co-producers through payments are susceptible to all of the usual 
harms of public expenditures, including corruption, clientelism and 
goal displacement, among others.
Certification is another arrangement discussed in the book, and 
the term is used to capture the activities of many non-state actors 
involved in areas such as forestry, fisheries, organic foods and other 
similar areas in which quality control and enforcement of standards 
is accomplished less directly than in the case of traditional command 
and control regulation (Cashore, Auld, & Newsom, 2004). In the case 
of certification, legitimacy and trust are key aspects of the certifying 
organizations and predictors of the success of voluntary certifica-
tion arrangements, as certification functions effectively only if trust 
exists between the public and the certifiers and between the certifiers 
and the certified companies and governments. Concerns about sec-
ond-class regulation or corrupt standards can easily undermine years 
of work building up a certified brand. Similarly, competing or duel-
ling certifiers can also undermine existing schemes and lead to their 
ineffectiveness.
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Contracting is probably the most well-known such activity 
and involves governments in reducing the level of direct state 
 involvement in the provision of public services, including internal 
state services, through the replacement of civil servants and internal 
procurement processes with contractual arrangements with, usually, 
non-governmental organizations, primarily businesses (Vincent-
Jones, 2006). In the case of contracting, however, many supporters 
of the concept have noted significant limitations that can prevent 
this kind of governance arrangement from functioning effectively. 
The 2016 Nobel Prize in Economics, for example, was awarded to two 
economists who specialize in detailing the significant flaws and 
limits of contracting in areas such as prisons and healthcare (Hart, 
2017; Holmström & Milgrom, 1991). These and other studies of private- 
public partnerships such as the ones in this volume highlight the 
need to carefully negotiate realistic contracts and overcome signifi-
cant information asymmetries and knowledge gaps if these are to be 
successful.
Commissioning is another collaborative technique discussed in the 
book. It goes well beyond traditional procurement and out sourcing 
agendas by involving ‘third sector’ actors, such as NGOs in both 
service target formulation and design (‘co-design’) as well as service 
delivery (‘co-management’) (Sturgess, 2018). Commissioning suffers 
from many of the same issues as contracting and co-production, 
however. As Taylor and Migone (2017) note, commissioning “means 
that the organizations involved must redefine their relations with 
the  public administration, with the clients/users of the services 
on another and with each other”. This requires high levels of trust 
between all of these groups, which may be lacking.
Policy capacity is thus a key requisite of the effective operation of 
any mode of governance (Wu, Ramesh, & Howlett, 2015). Every one 
of these forms of governance requires a high level of state and actor 
capacity in order to function effectively, but whether such capacity 
exists and how it is mobilized is a significant issue rarely addressed 
in the literature on the subject. The use of such arrangements thus 
requires better and stronger empirical and conceptual analysis, and it 
is very good to see the critical and informative essays and case  studies 
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in this volume beginning to address these issues in a systematic 
 fashion.
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Chapter 9 
The Value Neutrality of 
‘Smart’ and ‘Self’-Governance
Christopher Koliba
There is an implied consensus that is reflected in this volume that 
the practice of public administration has been shaped by a series of 
major transitions over time. In the opening chapter of the volume, 
Koppenjan, Termeer and Karré lay out an interpretation of these 
transitions as including traditional public administration, new pub-
lic management (NPM) and two forms of new public governance 
(NPG). It is widely apparent that the first two modalities of public 
administration reflected in this table, traditional public adminis-
tration and new public management, have been seasoned enough to 
be deemed ‘irrefutable’. Shifts in practices resulting from the addition 
of private sector actors into the governance of societies signify the 
transition from traditional public administration to NPM. The effort 
embodied in NPM to ‘make governments act more like businesses’ 
has led to the widespread privatization of public services, a focus 
on ‘customer’ services within those government agencies that still 
offer direct services, and process-based regulation in which the tra-
ditional regulatory functions of the public sector are either loosened 
or relinquished in favour of industry, resulting in, at best, forms 
of self-regulation that generally are quite effective (Mills, Koliba, & 
Reiss, 2016), and at worst not only ineffective but downright negligent 
(Mills & Koliba, 2014).
The answer to the question ‘What comes next?’ in the evolution of 
public administration is, in part, the theme of this volume. Around 
the turn of the twenty-first century public administration scholars 
112
widely recognized the failed promises of NPM, and sought ways to 
build stronger public values back into a ‘new’ theoretical framework. 
New public governance has been the most widely adopted framing, 
but there are other strong contenders as well. Network governance, 
in particular, has also established itself, with some even suggesting 
that the new public governance is actually a more normative version 
of network governance, with various forms of collaborative and net-
work management prescriptions to follow. The key assertions of new 
public governance and network governance are arguably the same. 
The range of actors playing in the sphere of public governance and 
public policy extend beyond the State to include the non-profit and 
for-profit sectors. The awareness of the networked ties between these 
actors through the enactment of various policy tools has implied 
that, indeed, the effective governance of societies is not simply rele-
gated to the State. It is a collective undertaking requiring a good 
measure of collaboration, coordination and cooperation (Keast & 
Mandell, 2014). What we call this ‘new’ form of collective governance 
is still unsettled. Some have argued that this era is marked by a focus 
on ‘collaborative governance’, while others view network governance 
as existing not only in the shadow of hierarchy but in an integrated 
element of governance networks (Koliba, Meek, Zia, & Mills, 2018). 
Koppenjan, Termeer and Karré likely label this approach as a form of 
‘new public governance: collaborative network governance’.
The interesting turn of events in this narrative concerns the 
question of whether public governance as network governance 
is sufficient? Are there practices and norms left out that cannot 
be accounted for in the now triumvirate of classical PA, NPM and 
NPG/NG? The editors of this volume believe so and key in on ‘self- 
governance’ and ‘smart governance’ as a focus. This approach to 
self- and smart governance is viewed less as a new paradigm and 
more as a means of incremental adjustments. Although no one in this 
volume uses the term ‘situational awareness’, it is a useful concept 
to introduce here (Endsley, 1995). Situational awareness is employed 
by effective leaders all of the time (as widely recognized in con-
cepts like situational leadership) (Hersey, Blanchard, & Natemeyer, 
1979). Effective leaders learn how to ‘read’ a situation and adopt a 
wide array of skills, traits and knowledge to meet the needs of the 
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moment. Arguably, those leading self- and smart governance efforts 
do the same, though at a more aggregated level. Instead of individual 
skills and traits, collective policy tools and social practices enable 
a diverse array of actors to collaborate, coordinate or cooperate to 
achieve public service goals. In this volume we are exposed to a vari-
ety of these tools: public-private partnerships, innovative forms of 
citizen engagement, the use of social media and online platforms to 
share information and coordinate action, and novel forms of inter-
governmental relations. All of these cases share a common thread: 
the orchestrators of these undertakings have employed policy and 
social enterprise tools to address a public need.
The extent to which the examples in this volume actually reflect 
something worthy of a new label, such as ‘self-governance’ or ‘smart 
governance’, is the question being raised here. In some of these 
 examples, there are echoes of deference to the use of market mecha-
nisms, treading into grounds long covered by NPM. Other examples 
speak of innovations in public engagement, themes that can be 
traced all the way back to traditional public administration and a 
wide variety of nuanced and very important addenda to it, namely 
the new public administration (Marini, 1971), the new public service 
(Denhardt & Denhardt, 2003) and ongoing considerations of authentic 
public engagement (King, Feltey, & Susel, 1998). The newest edition 
to this mix concerns advances in information technology as a means 
of undertaking collective action (Mergel & Bretschineider, 2013). 
Even these practices have been found in the literature concerning 
 e-governance, e-government, crowdsourcing and so on, leaving little 
doubt that the future of public administration and the governance 
of societies are called not only to react to and integrate new uses of 
information technology but also to anticipate and manage their use.
The use of the ‘self’-governance in this volume speaks to the impor-
tance of self-organization, a property of complex adaptive systems 
(Koliba & Koppenjan, 2015). To this effect, self-governance grounds 
agency in the motivations of specific actors and also aggregates to 
form a wider, systems-level, whole. The key to understanding the role 
of complexity and governance lies in this basic idea: that the whole is 
more than the sum of its parts. The resultant synergies, when in fact 
they are synergistic, can generate genuine public value. The range of 
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governance tools highlighted in this volume can all be harnessed to 
create public value. Successful implementation of these tools should 
be judged on this basis. The recent renewed interest in public values 
may be called on in this regard to define standards against which 
to tie performance evaluation (Bryson, Crosby, & Bloomberg, 2014). 
Our theories of new public governance and network governance need 
to evolve a deeper understanding, appreciation and, most impor-
tantly, a set of practices around which to render these assessments. 
It is possible, after all, to self-organize our way into disruption and 
chaos. Looting, for example, is a form of self-organization of chaotic 
crowds. The perpetuation of ‘fake news’ memes across social media is 
an outgrowth of self-organization. Self-governance is not inherently 
supportive of the public good and generation of public value.
The use of the term ‘smart’ throughout this volume also needs 
to be problematized, an observation made by Termeer, Toonen, Kok 
and Turnhout in this volume. It is unclear how the use of the term 
smart in the context of this volume, namely as the means of reading 
situations and employing a wide variety of policy tools and hybrid 
structures, is particularly useful. Smart people can, and often do, 
make poor decisions. We tend to equate smartness to a positive 
 virtue, and to a notion that has deep roots in the Enlightenment. 
But we must be cautious here. Take, for example, the case of Enron, 
the energy utility based out of California that essentially drained 
billions of dollars of value from shareholders by creating bogus 
energy trading schemes. Enron leaders always boasted about 
being ‘the smartest people in the room’. Supposedly smart people 
also  created the mortgage derivatives market that led to the Great 
Recession of the late 2000s.
The use of the term ‘smart’ has taken on additional meanings. 
For instance, the move to digitize the electricity grid has been 
labelled as the ‘smart grid’ (Koliba, DeMenno, Brune, & Zia, 2014). 
The incorporation of remote sensing for purposes of urban planning 
and community development has fuelled the ‘smart cities’ movement. 
Smart transportation systems have been devised to regulate traffic 
congestion and improve air quality (Koliba, Campbell, & Zia, 2011). 
And, of course, we are all bearing witness to the smartphone rev-
olution and any number of smart home, smart appliances, and smart 
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[insert any noun here]. In all of these contexts, smartness is equated 
to the expansion of the availability of information resulting from the 
integration of technology into almost all facets of life. In these cases, 
being smart is equated with being informed and, more importantly, 
using this information to govern better. For instance, the smart grid 
has enabled utilities to recover from power outages more efficiently. 
Smart transportation systems have, at least in some cases, reduced 
traffic congestion. The smart cities movement promises to improve 
the quality of life of urban residents. However, these technologies 
have their drawbacks. Smart technologies do not necessarily equate 
to positive results, namely enhanced public goods and public value.
In sum, the implementation of the tools highlighted in this volume 
needs to be evaluated on the basis of norms and performance stand-
ards that are not inherent features of the tools themselves. For us to 
arrive at a deep consensus regarding the governance paradigm that 
adds to traditional PA and NPM, this normative basis needs to be not 
only highlighted but accentuated. To this effect, aspects of new pub-
lic governance and network governance need to be integrated with 
the more values-based new public administration (which focused on 
the importance of social equity), new public service (which focused 
on the importance of liberal democratic norms) and the ongoing 
discourses regarding public value. Otherwise, we may find more 
instances of self-governance, smart governance and hybrid govern-
ance but not better results relative to the common good.
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Chapter 10 
Organizing for Smart 
Practices: Out of the Silos
Per Lægreid
In this volume the issue of new governance arrangements and 
whether they represent a hybrid and smarter form of governance 
is addressed. My reflections are based mainly on experiences from 
research conducted through studies of innovative coordinating 
practices in public management (Lægreid, Rykkja, Ramnda Liiv, 
& Sarapuu, 2014). I will sum up the findings in ten propositions.
First, tasks matter. New governance arrangements have been initiated 
to counteract the ‘siloization’ or ‘pillarization’ of the public sectors. 
Governments have developed new approaches to address transbound-
ary ‘wicked problems’ (Lægreid & Rykkja, 2015). The need for smarter 
governance arrangements is especially pressing when the problem 
structure does not overlap with the organization structure. The new 
arrangements seek to integrate and to create joint problem- solving 
across organizational boundaries, administrative levels sectors and 
policy areas.
Second, context matters. The new governance arrangements are 
related to the surrounding political and administrative environ-
ments. There is no ‘best practice’ that would work everywhere for 
all tasks or a panacea that can be easily copied from one context 
to another. Adaptation to the local context matters (Pollitt, 2013). 
It makes a difference whether we are facing a high-trust or a low-trust 
context, low corruption or high corruption, a good financial situation 
or a bad one and a consensus-based or confrontational policy style. 
118
The challenge is to relate new governance arrangements to specific 
types of context.
Third, politics and power matter. New governance instruments are 
not value-free technical and ‘neutral’ administrative tools. Smart 
gover nance arrangements are often political, involving power rela-
tions. They address efficiency and effectiveness, but also issues of 
participation, trust and political control. It is not only about gover-
nance capacity but also about governance legitimacy (Lægreid & 
Rykkja, 2018). It is necessary to take politics into account when 
designing smart governance arrangements. Support from key 
stakeholders is necessary, and a balance of expertise and represen-
tativeness is important for the appropriate design and successful 
implementation of new governance practices.
Fourth, a mixed political-administrative system matters. Choosing 
the appropriate mix of basic governance mechanisms is crucial for 
smarter governance. Networks and partnerships normally operate in 
the shadow of hierarchy. New governance arrangements are typically 
supplementing existing arrangements, producing a layered and more 
hybrid and complex public administrative apparatus. Agility, adap-
tation, institutional syncretism and system maintenance are more 
typical than radical change (Greve, Lægreid, & Rykkja, 2016).
Fifth, process matters. High motivation and leadership are vital. 
However, changes cannot be based on a top-down mechanism alone. 
Successful implementation of a coordination instrument requires 
involvement by stakeholders (Greve et al., 2016). It is generally diffi-
cult to join together distinctive cultures of different organizations 
that need to cooperate. However, shared culture and common inter-
ests make coordination easier. Thus, not only external motivation by 
incentives but also intrinsic motivation by socialization and profes-
sional integrity matters.
Sixth, resources matter. Adequate resources are needed for success-
ful governance arrangements. Working across organizational borders 
is a resource-demanding process (Lægreid et al., 2014). The working 
of complex coordination arrangements cannot be taken for granted, 
and the initiators of new practices should be aware of costs related to 
such initiatives. Extra resources are necessary not only for the estab-
lishment of a new coordination instrument but also for its smooth 
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running on an everyday basis. It would be wise to consider carefully 
the combination of different kinds of scope and intensity given to a 
specific coordination arrangement.
Seventh, accountability matters. Accountability for joint results is 
a key issue when creating new governing initiatives. Accountability 
relationships tend to become increasingly complex and hybrid 
when government acquires a horizontal and multilevel character 
(Olsen, 2017). It is necessary to go beyond traditional hierarchi-
cal accountability relationships and to allow for more horizontal 
accountability. Accountability issues are also related to performance 
targets. Transboundary targets and interorganizational coordinating 
arrangements face the risk of being downplayed by vertical hierarchi-
cal steering and accountability.
Eight, impact matters. There is a lack of reliable data about effects 
and results of new governance arrangements. Effects are often prom-
ised or assumed but seldom well documented (Pollitt & Dan, 2013). 
New governing instruments often tend to show mixed results, unex-
pected consequences and side effects. To minimize such effects, new 
governing practices should be carefully designed and grounded on 
realistic goals and expectations. A gradual introduction of new initi-
atives might be useful. The introduction of new governance practices 
may be considered a learning process for which both feedback and 
assessment systems are necessary to provide reliable knowledge of 
effects.
Ninth, time matters. The launch of a novel governance arrange-
ment cannot be considered a quick fix to complex problems. It is often 
necessary to go beyond a short time perspective to achieve a smarter 
governance system (Boston, 2017). Building new governance practices 
is a matter of patience, and effects cannot be expected within short 
budget and election cycles. Unexpected conditions can also change 
the implementation of governance reforms. The development of new 
governance practices is often a moving target that requires adaptabil-
ity of participants and consistent steering by leaders.
Summing up, diversity matters. New governance arrangements 
vary both in scope and in intensity (Boston & Gill, 2011). One can 
distinguish between temporary and permanent arrangements, 
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policy making and implementation, type of actors involved, 
horizontal and vertical arrangements and different targets. 
These arrangements might realign organizational borders, creating 
formal or informal partnerships, be mandatory or voluntary and 
vary from shared responsibilities to shared information. This diverse 
landscape makes it necessary to specify what kind of arrangements is 
addressed. One arrangement does not fit all.
The conclusion is that one should be careful not to oversell new 
smart practices. They work under specific conditions and circum-
stances, but a humble approach might be wiser. We have to go beyond 
generic macro-level theories to understand the emergence of new 
smarter governance arrangements and how they work in practice 
(Christensen & Lægreid, 2016). Meso-level theories that take the con-
textual features into account are probably more fruitful. Single-factor 
explanations face considerable limitations. Instrumental and delib-
erate design by political and administrative executives is constrained 
by cultural factors and historical-institutional traditions as well as by 
polity features and environmental factors.
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Chapter 11 
What Do We Talk About 
When We Talk About Hybrid 
Governance?
Eva Sørensen and Jacob Torfing
Hybrid governance can be defined as a governance arrangement that 
combines elements of well-known and often lone-standing gover-
nance tools such as hierarchies, markets, self-governed communities 
and cross-boundary networks and allows the various elements to 
coexist and merge in a relatively coherent way. Fortunately, we seem 
to have entered a period in which the ideological belief that there is 
one best way to govern society and the economy is being replaced 
by pragmatic experimentation that mixes and matches governance 
tools in order to obtain a desirable result. This short piece reflects on 
the significance, consequences and evaluation of hybrid governance 
arrangements and sets forth some future research tasks.
11.1 The Rise and Significance of Hybrid Governance
For some time now, hierarchies, markets, self-governing communi-
ties and cross-boundary networks have been regarded as coexisting. 
Depending on the context and the nature of the problem or task, each 
of these governance tools may appear to have a particular comparative 
advantage that helps to produce an efficient and effective solution. As 
a rule of thumb, the exercise of public authority calls for hierarchical 
governance; the delivery of standardized services is provided most effi-
ciently by markets; problems such as crime protection, child obesity 
and lack of social well-being that require solutions based on proximity, 
empathy and solidarity should be addressed by self-governed commu-
nities; and the creation of innovative solutions to wicked problems is 
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a task for governance networks (Torfing, Peters, Pierre, & Sørensen, 
2012).
Today, this contingency theory no longer provides a universal 
guide for decision makers aiming to govern our increasingly com-
plex and fragmented societies. Since each of the different governance 
tools has a specific set of merits and problems, we often see attempts 
to combine different governance tools in order to obtain all the com-
bined benefits, in the hope that the problems of one governance tool 
will be compensated for by the merits of another governance tool.
The different governance tools may each have a compara-
tive advantage in a particular phase of public problem-solving. 
Hence, when pushed to the extreme, it is no longer uncommon to 
find a public gover nance arrangement in which elected government 
sets the agenda and the overall direction for public problem-solving 
and creates a platform for a plethora of public and private actors to 
form a network that generates new and innovative solutions that are 
subsequently endorsed by political and administrative authorities. 
In the production and delivery of the new solutions, private for-profit 
companies may deliver standardized products or services, while 
public-private partnerships design, construct and maintain relevant 
infrastructures and community actors provide access to local skills 
and resources. Public administrators, or third-party monitoring 
agencies, help to keep track of the results, and the adaptation of 
the new solutions to unforeseen events is negotiated among all the 
involved actors.
Hybrid forms of governance tend to vary in terms of which and 
how many governance tools they combine. They also vary in terms 
of their relative coherence and level of integration. Finally, although 
hybrid governance arrangements tend to be a result of intentional 
design based on adaptive learning, the role of trial and error and 
chance discoveries will also vary.
11.2 Consequences of Hybrid Governance
It is important to assess the consequences of hybrid governance 
arrangements for public governance as a whole. The contribu-
tions in the first half of this book seem to support the claim that 
hybrid governance tends to produce ‘soft governance’ (Moos, 2009). 
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Hence, the involvement of different kinds of public and private actors 
in the different parts of hybrid governance arrangements means that 
‘hard governance’ based on legal regulation, order giving and incen-
tives loses its foundation in public authority and gives way to a ‘soft 
governance’-based orchestration of action, relational coordination, 
voluntary standards, mediation, storytelling and transformational 
leadership. By shaping the identity and behaviour of social and eco-
nomic actors, including users and citizens, these forms of governance 
can be quite effective.
As hinted at earlier, it is expected that the skilful combination 
of different governance tools, which each have different merits, 
will improve the overall quality of governance. Problems and blind 
spots associated with a particular lone-standing governance tool 
are compensated for by combining it with another governance tool. 
Contract-based partnerships that may foster opportunistic behaviour 
are combined with collaborative interaction, or a hierarchical display 
of public authority that may alienate people with social needs is com-
bined with mobilization of local communities that provides trust and 
solidarity.
What we must not forget is that the enhanced quality of public 
governance that tends to increase the output legitimacy of the pub-
lic sector is accompanied by a deepening of democracy that tends to 
increase the input legitimacy of public governance. Hence, in relation 
to hybrid governance arrangements, citizens are able to participate 
not only as voters in regular elections but also as customers with exit 
and voice options in quasi-markets, as members of NGOs partici-
pating in networks and partnerships and as volunteers providing 
community services to their fellow citizens. Thus, the number of 
channels through which citizens can influence their daily living 
conditions has expanded, although it can be difficult to determine 
exactly how much influence can be achieved in and through the dif-
ferent forms of participation.
The dark side of hybrid governance is that the overall complexity 
of public governance is greatly increased through the combination of 
two or more governance tools in the same hybrid governance arrange-
ment. Governance tools informed by different operational and 
behavioural logics are interlaced in the production of joint outputs 
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and outcomes. The potential and combined benefits are enhanced, 
but so are the potential problems and failures. Many things can go 
wrong, not least in the coupling between different governance tools, 
thus increasing the vulnerability of public governance. When hybrid 
gover nance fails to produce the expected results, or creates unfore-
seen negative externalities, it is difficult to hold the responsible 
actors to account.
The risk of failure means that hybrid governance arrangements 
must be carefully managed through reflexive second-order ‘metagov-
ernance’ (Sørensen & Torfing, 2009). The new research on hybrid 
governance seems to suggest that metagovernance is not only con-
cerned with framing, institutionalization, process management and 
participation in relation to specific forms of governance but also 
involves the choice, combination and constant management of inter-
actions between different governance tools.
Finally, an important consequence of hybrid governance is that 
it challenges the role perceptions of key actors. Public and private 
actors involved in hybrid governance cannot go it alone but must be 
open to collaboration and power sharing. In societies characterized 
by administrative silos, clear sector divides and strong organizational 
boundaries, turf wars and reluctance to give other actors the space 
they need to perform may undermine the prospects for hybrid gover-
nance.
11.3 Evaluating Governance Innovation
A key challenge for researchers and practitioners is to evaluate hybrid 
forms of governance. The relative success of hybrid governance 
arrangements should be measured against the desired outcomes in 
terms of their ability to mobilize actors and harness complexity in 
the production of efficient and effective solutions over which there is 
broad-based ownership. The chapters in this book indicate that the 
high expectations of hybrid governance are not always met in real-
ity, but here we should remember that hybrid governance is a type of 
innovation and that innovations often fail in the first iteration before 
they are adjusted and adapted through processes of experiential learn-
ing (Torfing, 2016). Thus, it might be wise to treat the formation of 
hybrid governance as a design experiment in which the overall goals 
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and expectations are agreed on and the innovative governance design 
is tested, assessed and redesigned through a series of iterations until 
expectations are met.
11.4 Future Research Avenues
Hybrid governance is likely to become a key topic in future research. 
In particular, three key research tasks deserve further attention. 
First, the big question is how to articulate different governance tools 
so as to avoid conflicts and create synergies. The study of ‘pluricentric 
coordination’, defined as a process of mutual adaptation in decentred 
contexts (Pedersen, Sehested, & Sørensen, 2011), offers a promising 
way forward in this respect. Second, the question of scaling is crucial. 
Hybrid governance at the local level might need to be scaled up to the 
regional or national level, thus expanding the strategic horizon of the 
involved actors to deal with pressing problems. The dynamics and 
challenges involved in such scaling processes need careful analysis 
(Ansell & Torfing, 2018). Finally, since the proof of the pudding is in the 
eating, we need to study whether governance innovation actually helps 
to produce service and policy innovations that enhance public value 
production (Hartley, 2005).
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Chapter 12 
Hybrids: Smart, Dumb, Solution 
or Problem?
Janine O’Flynn
12.1 Hybridity: Wrestling with the Beast
Hybridity is nothing new. Public management scholars have become 
increasingly interested in the idea – as is evidenced by the collection of 
studies here – however, this is not the first wave of hybridity studies in 
our field. The authors here draw out a fascinating range of theoretical 
and practical tensions and questions through their exploration of the 
links between hybridity and smarter governance. In doing so, they 
also provoke many new (and old) questions that we need to explore to 
develop our understanding of hybridity. It is also important that we 
start to get much more connected to rich interdisciplinary literature 
that can help our field to advance our understanding of hybridity.
Hybrids have been described in many ways – as mixes, something 
in between or neither one nor the other. For sociologist Heydebrand 
(1989) hybrids are the interpenetration of markets and hierarchies; 
for economist Williamson (1979) they are neither one nor the other 
but rather an intermediate form that combines aspects of both. 
Williamson (1991) described how forms such as long-term contract-
ing, reciprocal trading, regulation and franchising were all examples 
of hybrid governance (Williamson, 1991). Hybrids, he argued, sacrifice 
some advantage of markets and hierarchies in these more intermedi-
ate forms. In management and organizational studies, writers such as 
Ouchi (1980) explored neither one nor the other idea, which developed 
into his concept of clannish governance approaches – neither markets 
nor hierarchies but perhaps networks; this idea served as an inspira-
tion for a generation of network scholars.
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Amid the market-based reforms of the 1980s and 1990s, scholars 
studying the transformation of public services drew on ideas of 
hybridity to help them explain and describe how governance forms 
were changing. More market-like practices were emerging, but hier-
archies (and bureaucracies) remained steadfast, producing a range 
of tensions in these new ways of governing. When the balance of the 
market-hierarchy mix tipped towards markets, Menard (1995) argued 
that quasi-markets developed. And work by Vincent-Jones (1997) 
drew out in much more detail the various forms of hybrids that were 
emerging, especially in studies of reforms in local government in the 
UK, where he made the case that quasi-markets were a peculiar form 
of hybrid.
Hybridity has long lineage we can engage in. And we do need 
to engage much more with the rich strands of thought from other 
disciplines and look back and reflect on some of the early work on 
hybridity that emerged as large-scale, even paradigmatic, changes 
took place in the practice of public management.
12.2 Hybridity and Complexity
In this collection, the authors deploy hybridity to explore com-
plex, sometimes wicked problems. These examples illuminate the 
increasingly hybrid nature of how we practice the craft of governing. 
The authors draw out the potential for hybrid forms to help in address-
ing the challenges – hybrids as the smart solution. But need hybridity 
be so intimately linked with complexity? Could hybrid forms also be 
smart solutions to simple problems? Contingency and working out 
what works, and when, seems to be an important part of the age of 
hybridity.
It may also be the case that when hybridity and complexity meet, 
we create new problems, or exacerbate existing ones. This is not 
because we have dumb rather than smart solutions but because the 
complexity of hybrids themselves can mask toxic dynamics that can 
emerge when markets and hierarchies meet. Here we need to look 
to what emerges when we get the worst of both worlds, not the best. 
Koppenjan, Termeer and Karré in their introduction to this collection 
note that hybrids may become “destructive and counterproductive” 
(Chapter 1). In their concluding chapter, they also note that hybrids 
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are not just magical marriages but may also be monstrous combina-
tions (see Chapter 13).
My forthcoming work on ‘markets for misery’ shines a spotlight 
on these points, especially the claim that hybridity can combine the 
worst aspects into governance approaches that are neither smart nor 
solutions but that are catastrophic in their effects (O’Flynn, forth-
coming). This is especially the case when we move into some of the 
most complex, wicked problems confronting societies. In areas of 
extreme misery and misfortune such as irregular migration (bor-
ders and detention) and justice (prisons and probation), I argue 
that not only do hybrid forms enable exploitation but that they give 
rise to acute and pressing moral dilemmas. This is because they 
join together the forces of depersonalization, dehumanization and 
commodification, which creates toxic, destructive, monstrous com-
binations, not smart, adaptive, problem-solving hybridity.
12.3 What Is Next?
In the best of worlds, hybrid governance forms enable us to develop 
adaptive, smart solutions to complex problems. But this is only part 
of the story. In the worst of worlds, hybrid forms can be malevolent, 
a vehicle that enables the exploitation of misery and misfortune 
through the joining together of the worst features of markets and hier-
archies. As we continue to develop our understanding of hybrid forms, 
and move further into the age of hybridity, we must be able to account 
for the problems and challenges of hybridity, not just the smart solu-
tions they may offer. Will hybrids help us to solve some of the most 
complex challenges societies must contend with? Very likely. Will 
hybrids amplify some of these challenges and produce not just moral 
questions but further misery and misfortune? Undoubtedly.
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Chapter 13 
Comparing New Hybrid 
Governance Arrangements: 
Better and Smarter?
Joop Koppenjan, Katrien Termeer and Philip Marcel Karré
In this book, we presented the findings of five studies on a variety of 
hybrid governance arrangements that deal with wicked problems 
challenging today’s society. In chapter 1 we introduced the concept 
of smart hybridity to characterise these new arrangements. As many 
of the international contributors to this volume acknowledge, the 
shift towards hybrid governance is an important and generic interna-
tional phenomenon (cf. O’Flynn, Chapter 12). At the same time, hybrid 
governance arrangements may take many forms, and the nature and 
direction of the development towards smarter hybridity is not yet 
clear, nor well understood (Koliba, Chapter 9). Hybrid governance 
arrangements are not necessarily new, but the context, nature and 
scale of the use of hybridity have evolved over time. The theories and 
concepts at our disposal to analyse, understand and manage hybrid 
governance arrangements are still poorly developed. Moreover, our 
empirical knowledge about the phenomenon is limited (see Howlett, 
Chapter 8; Koliba, Chapter 9). This book aims to contribute to the 
development of this knowledge by looking at new hybrid governance 
arrangements in practice. More specifically, we examine the extent 
to which these arrangements meet the promises of tackling wicked 
problems in a better and smarter way. We do not address the question 
of whether hybridity in gover nance arrangements is a good idea by 
itself (as we see hybridity as an ongoing development that will not 
stop) but rather how these arrangements can be characterized, what 
mechanisms drive them, how they are managed, and what their 
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effects are. Overall, we aim to determine whether these hybrid gov-
ernance arrangements are really smart and hence whether they have 
indeed mastered the challenge of smart hybridity. However, as Koliba 
(Chapter 9) rightly argues, the concept of smartness is, like hybridity, 
not without problems, since it also is weakly conceptualized. In deal-
ing with criticism, we propose four categories of values to assess the 
smartness of hybrid governance arrangements. First, smart hybrid-
ity refers to arrangements and strategies that are both effective and 
efficient. They are smart in the sense that they avoid the high costs 
of large-scale reforms, by being incremental and tailor-made, and by 
using resources and opportunities that are already available. Second, 
information and information technologies play a prominent role in 
governance in the digital age. Innovative ways of using social media, 
digital platforms, or information disclosure systems are an impor-
tant asset of smart governance arrangements. Overall, this should 
result in innovative, informed and evidence-based solutions. Third, 
besides being effective and efficient, other public values must also be 
adhered to the concept of smartness, such as (democratic) legitimacy, 
equality, rule of law, representation, participation, empowerment 
and ownership. Fourth, in light of uncertainties and volatility that 
characterize wicked problems and the erosion of trust in societal 
institutions, sustainability and resilience are important values to be 
realized as well.
The analyses of smart hybridity as presented in this book 
(Chapters 2-6) are based on research projects conducted as part 
of a multi-year research programme into smart governance. For 
these research projects, experiences with new hybrid governance 
arrangements in diverse policy areas were studied. An international 
perspective was adopted, either by studying international, trans-
boundary practices, by making comparisons between practices in 
various countries or by putting Dutch cases in an international per-
spective. The studies of the governance practices and policy areas as 
presented in the various contributions to this book combine to create 
an overview of the variety of the playing field and the diversity of new 
hybrid governance arrangements with which today’s complex societal 
challenges are tackled.
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Despite their variety and diversity, these new governance arrange-
ments share a number of characteristics. They are utilized to tackle 
complex, wicked problems that involve a lack of consensus about 
their nature, causes and suitable solutions. Wicked problems also 
transcend organizational boundaries and administrative levels, that 
is, they cannot be resolved by any one administrative actor (Head & 
Alford, 2015; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016). Since they also cut across the 
borders of societal domains, they require collaboration with other 
social partners (e.g. citizens, societal organizations and businesses). 
Wicked problems are increasingly common in our rapidly changing 
society, in which society places heavy demands on government and 
its capacity to deliver, while at the same there is strong polarization 
and a loss of trust in existing institutions. The new governance 
arrangements that were studied for the contributions in this book 
strive to deal with these challenges in a context of uncertainty, ambi-
guity, volatility and limited resources. Instead of large-scale reforms, 
they involve mostly incremental changes that take place alongside 
existing forms of governance. Even in the case of the large-scale 
social care reform in the Netherlands, the hybridity of arrangement 
emerged on the shop floor, as a result of local actors trying to cope 
with the implications of the reform. The new, hybrid and smart gov-
ernance arrangements complement, react to and compensate for the 
downsides of existing governance modes or other (large-scale) inter-
ventions, and in doing so bring about substantial and transformative 
changes with limited effort (compare O’Flynn, Chapter 12).
In this concluding chapter, we compare the findings pertaining to 
the various practices of new, hybrid and smart governance arrange-
ments as described in the five empirical contributions (Chapters 2-6). 
We do so with the help of the questions formulated in the introduc-
tion:
1. What is the nature of these new hybrid governance arrangements 
used to address complex societal challenges, and what character-
istics do they share?
2. What assumptions and mechanisms form the foundation of these 
new hybrid governance methods, and how have they manifested 
themselves in practice?
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3. In what way do the new hybrid governance arrangements con-
tribute to solving complex challenges, and to what extent are they 
actually smart, in terms of effectiveness, innovative use of infor-
mation systems and enhancing and safeguarding public values 
like legitimacy and resilience?
In comparing the findings of the empirical chapters, we build on 
the reflections of internationally renowned governance scholars 
from various countries in different parts of the world (Chapters 7-12) 
that put the empirical studies perspective and enrich our reasoning 
regarding smart hybridity.
13.1 What Characterizes the New Hybrid Governance 
Arrangements?
Sørensen and Torfing (Chapter 11) define what we in this book under-
stand to be smart hybridity as “a governance arrangement that 
combines elements of well-known and often lone-standing governance 
tools such as hierarchies, markets, self-governed communities, and 
cross-boundary networks and allows the various elements to coexist 
and merge in a relatively coherent way”. The contributions in this 
collec tion all show characteristics of such mixtures. Furthermore, they 
all deal with innovations in governance that are designed to tackle the 
wicked problems that transcend existing organizational boundaries 
and administrative levels. The governance arrangements described 
here are focused on coordinating the behaviour of parties from various 
sectors, domains and administrative layers. They are all a response to 
the inadequacy of traditional forms of government (hierarchy, market, 
networks, self-governance) – sometimes because these are simply inef-
fective or too expensive, sometimes because the scale of governance 
does not match the scale of the issues at hand and sometimes because 
government is underperforming or even absent, as at the start of a 
crisis situation, as described in the contribution by Boersma et al. 
(Chapter 2). The governance arrangements pertaining to regional col-
laboration, described in the contribution by Schaap et al. (Chapter 5), 
and private self-governance in global value chains, described in the 
contribution by Termeer et al. (Chapter 6), are explicit attempts to fill 
institutional voids (see Hajer, 2003; Stephan, Uhlaner, & Stride, 2015). 
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The use of client networks in the social care domain, described in 
the contribution by De Roo et al. (Chapter 4), is a response to overly 
expensive and inefficient traditional provision of social care. Public 
private partnerships in delivering and managing public infrastruc-
ture, described in the contribution by Koppenjan et al. (Chapter 3), 
is inspired by the belief that the government cannot do a good job 
on its own.
The governance arrangements described here strive to provide 
better and more suitable solutions for complex societal issues by 
mobilizing other social and private resources, since it is apparent 
that governance models based solely on hierarchy, market, net-
works or societal self-governance fall short. The new governance 
arrangements combine the potential of these models in order to 
deal with the complexity and dynamic nature of today’s governance 
challenges. For example, public-private partnerships for the develop-
ment of infrastructure tie into the market model, yet contracts need 
to be supplemented with regulation and (network) collaboration 
(see Chapter 3). The contributions about global value chains and 
public- private partnerships (Chapters 6 and 3, respectively) show that 
the sole use of market instruments leads to opportunistic behav-
iour and that network and hierarchical governance must be utilized 
as well. In the case of urban regional governance (Chapter 5), net-
work governance leads to a democratic shortage, whereas societal 
or hierarchical governance could have beneficial effects. Finally, 
the contributions on self-governance in the social care domain 
(Chapter 4) and during crisis management (Chapter 2) show that 
professionals often play a prominent role in informal care and that 
citizens’ social media platforms become more effective when profes-
sional emergency services and governments use them as well.
Therefore, the one characteristic that all forms of smart gover-
nance discussed in the various contributions have in common is their 
hybrid nature (Brandsen & Karré, 2011; Johanson & Vakkuri, 2018; 
Karré, 2011; Skelcher & Smith, 2015): they combine the institutional 
logics of government, market and third sector. That is often done 
deliberately, but it may also be a result of sedimentation (Christensen 
& Lægreid, 2010; Emery & Giauque, 2014; Koppenjan, 2012; Streeck 
& Thelen, 2005). Although old governance modes make way for new 
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ones, there is never an entirely clean break with the past. For example, 
in the 1990s, when there was a focus on a business-like government, 
classic core values of traditional public administration, such as 
equality, rule of law and democracy still applied. Today, we continue 
to expect the government to use its available resources well and set up 
its services in an efficient and effective manner, in addition to being 
responsive to our wishes as a society.
At the same time, it can be observed that hybrid arrangements 
differ from each other. They combine different logics in different 
ways, with different intentions and probably different implications 
too. The study of hybridity should take these differences into account 
and focus on unravelling the dynamics and implications of the spe-
cific combinations of governance modes and logics, as, for example, 
Karré (2011) has done in his study of hybrid organizations, which each 
have their own and distinctive hybrid thumbprint and hence level of 
hybridity on a variety of dimensions. What the effects are of hybridity 
and whether its strengths or weaknesses are dominant depends on 
the specific characteristics of the hybrid in question. This asks for a 
nuanced view of hybridity that goes beyond seeing it purely as a risk 
or as an opportunity: it is often both.
The contributions show that the search for new and smart gover-
nance arrangements is not merely a Dutch affair, of course. Family 
group conferences were first introduced in New Zealand. Design, 
build, finance, maintain and operate (DBFM(O)) contracts for 
public-private partnerships are based on the UK’s example, which 
has since been adopted by countless other countries. Information 
platforms established by citizens appear all over the world during 
times of crisis. Similarly, the struggles with the question of regional 
governance and the certification of trade chains are international 
concerns as well.
13.2 What Are the Mechanisms behind the New Hybrid 
Governance Arrangements?
What mechanisms characterize the new governance arrangements 
described in this book? How do these relate to, for example, scien-
tific theories and society’s dominant views on governance? Two of 
the gover nance arrangements that were studied have been strongly 
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 influenced by new institutional economics and thinking in terms 
of market instruments, as they were propagated in the 1990s under 
the label of New Public Management (NPM). For both the govern-
ance of global value chains and the development and maintenance of 
public infrastructure contracts, market stimuli and a focus on per-
formance play major roles. Perhaps this is because these governance 
methods became popular during the heyday of neoliberalism and 
the New Public Management philosophy. Whereas the context of the 
certification of international trade chains was strongly affected by 
the world of business, government dominated the development of the 
DBFM(O) practice in the Netherlands by defining the public projects 
and limiting the opportunities for collaboration.
The new governance arrangements also appear to be influenced 
by ideas from more sociologically oriented governance and network 
theories, which are often grouped together under the term of New 
Public Governance (NPG) these days (Bryson, Crosby, & Bloomberg, 
2014; Koppenjan, 2012; O’Flynn, 2007; Osborne, 2010; Torfing & 
Triantafillou, 2013; see also Koliba, Chapter 9). Forms of contractual 
governance are supplemented with relational contracting, dis-
cussion, round tables, and so on with the intention of committing 
parties to shared goals and collaboration. This type of governance is 
therefore less about realizing predefined agreements and targets and 
more about facilitating learning processes, discovering and realizing 
shared interests and dealing with shared challenges. Whereas tradi-
tional governance makes use of predefined targets and performances, 
this new way of working allows for a greater degree of flexibility.
For the trade chains discussed in the contribution of Termeer et al. 
a third mechanism played a major role: public accountability. The cer-
tification’s label contributes to the traceability and visibility of the 
performances of the various links in the chain. In part, this ties into 
the neo-institutional philosophy that suggests citizens are rational 
actors that factor information regarding quality and sustainability 
into their purchasing behaviour. However, it also allows interest 
groups to use the media and public campaigns to put pressure on 
corporations and chains and therefore utilize societal governance 
mechanisms to affect the performance of trade chains.
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The urban regional partnership arrangements discussed in the 
contribution of Schaap et al. can be placed in the tradition of gover-
nance and network approaches, with the addition of ideas from 
New Public Management. The partnerships were solutions to the 
question of how local governments might voluntarily enter into 
arrangements when it comes to regional planning and economic 
development. Various private-law forms of organization are utilized, 
up to making policy development and implementation the almost 
exclusive responsibility of a non-governmental foundation. These 
hybrid urban regional governance arrangements could develop in a 
number of directions (although this is mere speculation): institu-
tional tripartite functional governance, fully public governance with 
implementation outsourced to private entities or robust horizontal 
public-private agreements.
The governance practices pertaining to family group confer-
ences in the social care domain (De Roo & Jagtenberg, Chapter 4) 
and Internet platforms used in crisis management (Boersma et al., 
Chapter 2) focus on the mobilization of citizens and their resources 
and competences. This suits our modern times with its increased 
focus on self-governance and citizen initiatives as a result of the 
failure of the government and the market. These ideas on self-gov-
ernance have a long history, but they became especially en vogue 
during the financial crisis. Government-propagated ideas and policy 
programmes pertaining to the big society, the strength of citizens 
and a do-it-yourself democracy tie into this (Blond, 2010; Delsen, 2010; 
Jordan, 2010). Many problems and challenges are too much for the 
government, market mechanisms and networks to handle, and hence 
they will have to be resolved by citizens and social organizations. 
With the help of proper training and the emergence of new informa-
tion systems and technological innovations, they are increasingly 
up to the task (Bolívar & Meijer, 2016). This also offers a solution 
for govern ments, which lack the financial resources to face today’s 
 societal issues on their own.
The governance mechanisms that characterize the examples dis-
cussed in the various chapters reflect various theoretical notions 
about governance. The aforementioned consideration shows a shift 
from coercion and control to a more enabling approach. There is also 
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more focus on a relational, sociological and political form of gover-
nance, moving away from the rational ‘homo economicus’. There is 
a focus on public values and trust but also on power relations and 
irrationality (Lowdness & Roberts, 2013; O’Flynn, 2007; Peters, 2019). 
At the same time, self-governance and self-organization appear to 
be an important common ingredient: it is shared by family group 
conferences, regional governance, crisis management, trade chains 
and private-public partnerships. Howlett (Chapter 8) mentions four 
collaborative techniques: co-production, certification, contracting 
and commissioning. In all cases, the governance arrangements strive 
to create room for other, non-government parties to make an optimal 
contribution to the co-production of solutions and services based on 
self-organization (Brandsen & Pestoff, 2006; Koliba, Meek, & Zia, 2018; 
Nederhand, Bekkers, & Voorberg, 2016).
13.3 Are the New Hybrid Governance Arrangements Smart?
In the preceding sections we concluded that the new governance 
arrangements described in this book were indeed hybrid. Now we turn 
to the question whether these hybrid arrangements are really smart. 
To what extent do they meet expectations, and what exactly are those 
expectations? Has there been an increase in effectiveness? Do they 
provide a solution for the erosion of the legitimacy of institutions and 
contribute to a more resilient society? Is innovation with information 
technologies realized? The contributions in this collection provide 
answers to these questions.
13.3.1 Effectiveness: Are New Governance Arrangements Smart Enough?
An important expectation attached to these new government arrange-
ments is that they are more effective than traditional approaches. 
The effectiveness of urban regional governance, as researched by 
Schaap et al., strongly depends on what the parties involved choose to 
consider the important aims of their collaboration. These aims vary 
among the various cases of urban regional governance  studied. What 
the various cases have in common is that a high degree of output legit-
imacy is reported. Apparently, hybrid urban regional governance can 
indeed be quite effective. The local citizen initiatives for crisis man-
agement, described in the chapter by Boersma et al., are also valued 
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for their contributions to the provision of emergency aid in situa-
tions where governments and NGOs fail to provide all that is needed. 
Nevertheless, the question remains as to whether the up scaling of 
these platforms practices can be successful and whether these prac-
tices will result in successful collaboration with governments. The 
performance of public-private partnerships for the development of 
public infrastructure tend to vary. The practice of family group con-
ferences and client networks is still in its infancy, and hence it is too 
early to call it a success or a failure. Lastly, the successful development 
of certification systems for global trade chains has already contributed 
to sustainability targets, although that contribution now appears to be 
stagnating.
If we make a distinction between the successful introduction 
of new governance arrangements and their ultimate performance 
in order to determine their effectiveness, we can say that regional 
governance, trade chains and public-private partnerships have had 
a successful and therefore effective implementation. This applies to 
a limited extent to family conferences and citizen platforms during 
crises, since their level of institutionalization is still low. It is  possible 
that new smart governance arrangements have to go through a 
learn ing curve. After a difficult – or successful – start, the question 
remains as to the extent to which the parties involved can manage to 
consolidate or scale up the new practice. If they succeed, an increase 
in effectiveness is to be expected. However, the case of the certifica-
tion of trade chains shows that it is also possible to reach a point at 
which mainstreaming, institutionalization, and standardization 
result in diminishing returns. It is quite possible that the effective-
ness and smartness of governance arrangements are limited by time, 
that is, that they are smart only for a certain period.
13.3.2 Innovation and the Application of Information Systems: More 
Innovative Products and Services?
Most of the discussed governance arrangements show high knowl-
edge intensity and new ways of using information. In the case of the 
information platforms used during crises and the certification of 
international value chains, information systems and the exchange of 
data are core elements of the new governance arrangement. They are 
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a major factor in the exchange and utilization of information during 
governance processes. At the same time, the case of the certification 
in international value chains shows that information systems and the 
use of information are not neutral but are strategically employed by the 
parties involved. The challenge is therefore to realize safeguards during 
the design and use of these systems that also guarantee parties’ trust 
in the systems. In the case of the public-private partnerships (PPPs) for 
infrastructure projects, information and the information exchange 
between the public client and the private contractor are crucial aspects. 
Typical patterns can develop in principal-agent relationships under the 
influence of information asymmetry. Information systems, standard 
contracts and standardized assessment tools are attempts to streamline 
the information and minimize differences in interpretation and trans-
action costs. Nevertheless, these instruments and the strategic ways in 
which they are utilized are not immune to criticism. The discussions 
about the correct interpretation of contract clauses are infamous. It is 
also notable that in the Netherlands the monitoring system to track the 
performance of PPP projects has been placed in private hands, under-
mining the independent and reliable assessment of the performance 
of these projects. These PPP projects are characterized by a high degree 
of knowledge intensity, as well as disagreement on and mistrust of 
knowledge. Information and information sharing are also important 
factors in the social care sector. This is similarly plagued by problems 
concerning the reliability of information, for example regarding 
accountability and payments. It leads to more bureaucracy, which in 
turn can jeopardize the effectiveness of the new governance arrange-
ments. In the case of regional governance, information and knowledge 
are major factors in the substantiation of regional plans and activities. 
The credibility of the substantiation of plans and projects poses a sig-
nificant challenge for the parties involved, especially in light of the 
distance between local actors and politicians, on the one hand, and the 
planning and decision-making at the regional level on the other.
The new governance arrangements discussed in the various con-
tributions can all be seen as examples of social innovation (Brandsen, 
Evers, Cattacin, & Zimmer, 2016; Cels, Jong, & Nauta, 2012; Mulgan, 
2007, 2015; Tollefson, Zito & Gale, 2012) because actors interact with 
each other in new ways. However, do these new practices also result 
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in new and innovative products and services? IT platforms, the 
self-governance of trade chains and family group conferences can be 
cited as positive examples, although the articles also show that the 
innovations in public-private partnerships disappoints and that the 
innovations in trade chains results in the perpetuation of existing 
interests. The mainstreaming, institutionalization and standardiza-
tion of new arrangements may even imply that further innovation is 
no longer to be expected: in the contributions in this volume it is, for 
instance, argued that further improvements to the sustainability of 
production and trade chains will likely occur only outside the certi-
fication industry and that future-proof public infrastructure based 
on smart information technology or high-tech solutions such as 
 autonomous vehicles will not be realized with DBFM(O) contracts.
13.3.3 Legitimacy: For Whom Are the New Smart Governance Mechanisms 
Actually Smart?
A leading thought behind the introduction of new smart governance 
arrangements was that its increased effectiveness would also result in 
more legitimacy for governments and institutions. Legitimacy in this 
reasoning, apparently, is equated to output legitimacy; effectiveness 
results in more support. However, the question is whether effective-
ness and legitimacy are always directly related. The contribution on 
urban regional governance offers some support for this belief: these 
governments have support because they are effective; that is, they have 
output legitimacy (Scharpf, 1997). However, output legitimacy is only 
one form of legitimacy. Legitimacy also depends on the involvement 
of democratically elected representatives and of affected stakeholders. 
The question of legitimacy as such is hardly being asked in the pro-
cess of creating regional governance arrangements, and citizens and 
local politicians are only marginally involved. This may eventually put 
regional collaboration at risk.
There is yet another reason why effectiveness does not necessarily 
enhance legitimacy. The definition of ‘effective’ may vary depending 
on the position of the parties involved. New governance arrange-
ments are not necessarily beneficial for everyone. Users, citizens 
and politicians are generally at a distance whenever governments 
and corporations collaborate on the development of infrastructure. 
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Small-scale producers often lack the necessary resources to meet 
the requirements of certification systems and are therefore at a dis-
advantage. Internet platforms are set up during times of crisis by the 
more self-reliant citizens, and direct attention and assistance towards 
the areas where they live. As a result, these platforms often do not 
provide information about the most vulnerable regions. Citizens 
and social organizations have to struggle to get involved in regional 
partnerships. Vulnerable clients have difficulty organizing their own 
care. Attempts to safeguard their position often put professionals in 
a central role, at the expense of clients and citizens.
So hybrid arrangements may result in an unequal allocation of 
values. O’Flynn (Chapter 12) describes how the use of hybrids in cases 
‘of extreme misery and misfortune’ may reinforce depersonalization, 
dehumanization and commodification, and give rise to pressing 
moral dilemmas.
Legitimacy and trust are based on commitment, involvement, 
participation opportunities and the feeling of being a co-owner of a 
solution, service or governance practice. In that sense, tension exists 
between striving towards efficiency and effectiveness, on the one 
hand, and participation and legitimacy, on the other. It is not easy 
to solve these tensions. It is not possible to optimize goals such as 
effectiveness, innovation, legitimacy and resilience all at once. Given 
these contradictory requirements, the legitimacy of these new gov-
ernance arrangements depends on the extent to which they succeed 
in striking a balance between these various requirements and prior-
itizing certain values over others depending on the situation at hand 
(Jørgensen & Bozeman, 2007; Veeneman, Dicke, & de Bruijne, 2009). 
This involves issues of democratic legitimacy, accountability and 
morality: who decides, and on what grounds, how these values should 
be balanced, and how and to whom account is given about this? 
(see e.g. Lægreid, Chapter 10)
13.3.4 Resilience: The Sustainability of Smart Hybridity
New governance arrangements based on the notion of smart hybrid-
ity are also expected to lead to more resilience. The contributions 
suggest that hybridity and the call for self-governance reinforce the 
robustness of solutions and services, as well as the resilience of the 
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government and of society. The combination of governance methods 
and the involvement of corporations, social organizations and citizens 
means that more parties and resources are mobilized and deployed 
in order to deal with the complex challenges that our society faces. 
This leads to redundancy and synergy. It allows for the formation of 
various defensive lines and attack formations, which may reinforce 
each other. At the same time, practices also show that these expecta-
tions are not always justified; vulnerable groups are left in the cold 
by these governance arrangements. The arrangements often support 
and reinforce each other where they are already strong or in such a 
way that parties with a lot of resources and capabilities benefit, while 
weak parties and public values tend to be neglected or underserved. 
The governance challenge is therefore to deploy these arrangements in 
such a way that institutional voids are filled, weak areas are reinforced 
and public values and the interests of vulnerable groups are safe-
guarded. Smart hybridity in this sense is not about finding shortcuts 
that result in low-cost, short-term gains but about the development of 
legitimate, sustainable practices that allow for long-term and widely 
accepted solutions that contribute to trustful relationships (compare 
Koliba, Chapter 9 and O’Flynn, Chapter 12). In this respect, an impor-
tant follow-up question to this research is, to what extent do hybrid 
arrangements remain successful over a longer period? Smart hybridity 
is not just about governing by hybridity, but also about the govern-
ing of hybridity. Hybridity can result in ‘magical’ marriages as well 
as ‘monstrous’ combinations (Jacobs, 1992; Howlett & Rayner, 2006; 
O’Flynn, Chapter 12). It has to be understood as a heads and tails issue, 
in the sense that benefits and risks most often are different sides of the 
same coin (Karré, 2011). That means the hybridity must be consciously 
recognized and managed.
13.4 Next­Step Challenges: Complications and Dilemmas
The contributions in this publication demonstrate that new hybrid 
governance arrangements do not necessarily lead to better results. 
In practice, those who implement them encounter complications and 
dilemmas. For example, major corporations are able to control the 
negotiations concerning certification systems, since the system will 
not function properly without their collaboration. Governments that 
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try to act as smart clients can be outsmartened by private parties that 
offer smart counter-steering in public-private partnerships. Citizen 
initiatives for crisis management can get in the way of professional 
emergency aid providers, while the latter often fail to fully utilize the 
potential of these citizen platforms. In hybrid urban regional gover-
nance arrangements, those involved face the choice of increasing their 
effectiveness by moving tasks to the regional level at the expense of 
the influence of local representative bodies and democratic legitimacy. 
During attempts to put clients and their networks at the centre of the 
provision of care, at the risk of asking too much from vulnerable cli-
ents and their families, the question remains as to who is ultimately in 
charge: the client, professionals or government officials.
Smart hybridity, therefore, does not necessarily or automatically 
result in better or smarter governance practices. O’Flynn (Chapter 12) 
even warns that hybrids, instead of providing solutions for wicked 
problems, could become the problem themselves, because they mask 
what she refers to as the ‘toxic dynamics’ when markets and hierar-
chies meet. Koliba (Chapter 9) states that forms of self-organization 
may also result in chaos or the perpetuation of ‘fake news’. Moreover, 
the other international contributions to this volume mention, in line 
with the findings of the empirical studies, that hybrids confront the 
parties involved with new, unexpected and complicated dilemmas. 
The extent to which these parties succeed in meeting the expectations 
associated with these new governance practices depends on their 
capabilities and competences. Therefore, Howlett argues that the 
effective operation of hybrid governance requires actors and orga-
nizations involved to possess the capacity to manage them (Howlett, 
Chapter 8).
13.5 Beyond Government Arrangements: On the Importance of 
Learning and Responsiveness to a Plurality of Values and 
Ethics
An expectation underlying the new, smart and hybrid governance 
arrangements discussed in this volume is that they have the potential 
to deal with the complexity, fragmentation and volatility of today’s 
wicked problems. The studies in this collection reveal that these 
expectations are met to a certain extent. This, however, is not always 
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or necessarily the case. Therefore, the smartness of new hybrid gov-
ernance arrangements should not be overrated (see also remarks on 
this by Howlett, Chapter 8 and Lægreid in Chapter 10). The studies of 
these arrangements show that although they are supposed to be smart, 
full stop, new governance arrangements are not necessarily smart for 
everyone and always come with new dilemmas and unintended side 
effects. After some initial or partial success, all of these new smart gov-
ernance practices faced next-step challenges. This implies that these 
new governance practices require continuous reflection on the part of 
those who apply them, in order to monitor their impacts and adjust 
their functioning accordingly and in order to keep them on track and 
mitigate and correct their unintended by- effects.
What is also consistently notable is the fact that these new gover-
nance arrangements do not develop in isolation from existing and 
more traditional forms of governance and that new and older forms 
of governance have to find a way to relate to each other. Bringing in 
volunteers affects the role of professionals. Citizen initiatives dur-
ing disasters must be coordinated with official emergency services 
and government activities. Public-private projects result in a call to 
focus less on the smartness of the contract and drastically change 
client-contractor relationships. Hybrid regional governance cannot 
simply break free from existing institutions of public law. Private 
certification systems must be reinforced by and complemented with 
government regulation (compare also Nederhand et al., 2016).
The new, smart and hybrid governance arrangements do not auto-
matically solve the complicated issues the parties are confronted with 
in dealing with wicked problems and complex societal challenges. 
The reason is that these governance practices are not neutral instru-
ments, but in applying them values are allocated (compare Koliba, 
Chapter 9). As Lægreid (Chapter 10) correctly emphasizes, “politics and 
power matter.” The contributions show that these instruments are 
often biased in the way they allocate these values. In the processes in 
which these governance arrangements are put into practice, actors 
are, to varying degrees, able to protect and pursue their interests. 
Strong parties, in particular, have more opportunities to operate in a 
smart manner and are often better able to learn quickly. New, smart 
governance practices, therefore, are not about simply applying an 
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instrument or arrangement but rather about new ways of governing 
that impose high demands on those in charge and must be accom-
panied by certain safeguards. Just like any other proposedly smart 
solution in any other context (e.g. smartphones, smart cities or smart 
grids) that promises to improve the quality of life, we have to remain 
cautious concerning possible drawbacks (Koliba, Chapter 9).
Dilemmas and competing values that are involved in new gover-
nance practices, as well as the diverse and dynamic contexts in 
which they are applied, mean that there are no standard prescrip-
tions on what makes up the success of these arrangements and how 
they should be applied in order to mitigate those shortcomings and 
manage their hybridity. The variety of combinations of governance 
modes and of their contexts precludes generalizations. As Lægreid 
(Chapter 10) states, no macro, general theory on hybridity exists, that 
might be helpful, given the particular, unique potentials, dilemmas 
and risks the specifics of hybrid combinations bring along.
The practices studied in the empirical contributions to this vol-
ume also shed light on the issue of the design of hybrid governance 
arrangements. They show that these arrangements tend to emerge as 
much as they are the result of intentional design. Even when designed, 
they end up being serendipitous recombinations of governance 
arrangements in response to the complexity of the circumstances and 
the context in which they are implemented (see, e.g. Christensen & 
Lægreid, 2010; Tenbensel, 2017). Lægreid (Chapter 10) adds that delib-
erate design is also constrained by context: historical- institutional 
traditions, polity features and environmental factors. Sørensen and 
Torfing (Chapter 11) refer to this when they argue that hybrid gov-
ernance arrangements tend to be a result based on adaptive learning, 
with an important role of processes of trial and error and chance dis-
coveries. Therefore, it is also likely that they cannot be prescriptively 
determined from the outset. As far as design is concerned, Sørensen 
and Torfing (2016) suggest that smart hybrids be treated as design 
experiments. These experimental designs should include options 
for monitoring and evaluation, followed by either termination or 
adjustment or gradual upscaling and mainstreaming. This conforms 
to recommendations made by for instance Termeer, Dewulf, and Van 
Lieshout (2010), Termeer, Dewulf, Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen, Vink, and 
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van Vliet (2016), and Pahl-Wostl (2009) on reflexivity and adaptive 
learning as generic conditions for the success of new governance 
arrangements.
This imposes high demands on the capacities and skills of actors 
involved (compare Emerson, Chapter 7 and Howlett, Chapter 8). 
In addition to the willingness to collaborate and break free from 
the shadow of one’s own organization, it also requires the ability 
to deal with changes and to keep learning. Emerson (Chapter 7) 
stresses the need to acknowledge the implication of hybridity for 
the  capabilities of public managers and decision makers, also in 
education and training programs. Besides having design sensibility, 
skills like being able to engage in dynamic interactions, to function 
as integrators, to handle conflicts and to work in open and pub-
licly accountable settings are important. Building on that insight, 
we would argue that given the complexity and the moral dimensions 
of the next-step challenges hybridity brings along, transparency, 
openness and accountability impose demands on the capabilities 
and ethics of those involved in hybrid governance. Smart hybridity 
should not be about bypassing administrative checks and balances, 
avoiding fair competition and participation in order to realize quick 
fixes, but should contribute to the realization of long-term and public 
values in a legitimate and sustainable way, enhancing trust and con-
tributing to the resilience of the system.
The application of these new governance practices is also an 
organizational issue: How can public organizations be rearranged 
and managed internally in a way that facilitates new forms of hybrid 
governance and deals with them in an adaptive manner (Brandsen & 
Karré, 2011; Jessop, 2003; Johanson & Vakkuri, 2018; Karré, 2011)?
13.6 Conclusions: Towards Smart Hybridity
Not all hybrid governance arrangements are smart, and not all smart 
arrangements are hybrid. We conclude this book with a summary 
of the features of governance arrangements characterized by smart 
hybridity, as described in the preceding chapters.
First, smart hybrids emerge as a more or less deliberate attempt to 
better deal with wicked problems that cross the boundaries of orga-
nizations, policy sectors, public-private domains and jurisdictions. 
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These hybrids combine not only modes of governance and instru-
ments but also various governance theories, contexts and cultures 
and institutionalized practices. Hybrid governance thus inherently 
involves processes of transformative change including barriers and 
resistance of existing governance regimes and related power systems.
Second, the evaluation of the level of smartness of new hybrid 
governance arrangements inherently requires a variety of criteria 
and values: Does the arrangement in question work (effectiveness)? 
Does it use new information (systems) and does it realize innova-
tions (innovativeness)? Is it legitimate and for whom (legitimacy and 
accountability), and does it result in sustainable practices that help 
in realizing solutions and public services that hold in the long term 
(resilience)? Hybrids that focus merely on effectiveness and efficiency 
thus do not qualify as smart, since they neglect the variety of values 
society expects governments to take into account in dealing with 
complex challenges and providing public services.
Third, smart hybridity is hard to grasp. Owing to inherent 
connec tions across scales and domains in complex societal sys-
tems, an arrangement that qualifies as smart today may evolve into 
tomorrow’s problem. Therefore, a crucial characteristic of smart 
hybridity is the capacity to learn, to adapt and to respond to foreseen 
and unforeseen circumstances and trade-offs. Thereby, special atten-
tion needs to be directed to the risk that hybrids may mask negative 
drawbacks. Smart hybrids require smart organizations and smart 
governance actors. By smart actors we mean actors who are reflective, 
who can bridge organizational boundaries and logics and who have 
a strong moral compass that guides them in dealing with compet-
ing public values and moral dilemmas. Such actors are committed 
to working in open publicly accountable settings, in contrast to 
the smart people who ‘created the mortgage derivatives market that 
led to the Great Recession of the late 2000s’ (Koliba, Chapter 9).
Given bad experiences with opaque governance structures and 
failed hybridity, one can hold the position that hybridity is in herently 
problematic and that pure governance modes should be the norm. 
We believe that given the increasing complexity of both  societal 
problems and governance systems, the question whether we want 
hybridity or not is a passed station. We now have to deal with the ques-
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tion of how hybridity can best be governed and how smartness can be 
realized. Like Sørensen and Torfing, for example, we see hybridity as a 
pragmatic governance style, going beyond ideological gridlocks that 
stand in the way of new solutions and innovative  services. We also 
agree with them that hybridity will not be a guarantee of success but 
that a pragmatic and experimental approach is needed. Since upfront 
knowledge about how to design smart hybridity perfectly does not 
exist, we should be prepared to learn, adapt and improve.
Seen in this way, the concept of smart hybridity provides prac-
titioners within the public sector with a new perspective on how to 
deal with complex challenges and demanding assignments. It may 
help them to understand the tensions and dilemmas that need to be 
addressed in order to fruitfully manage the hybridity of the instru-
ments and arrangements at their disposal and to fully use their 
potentials.
The concept of smart hybridity also sheds light on new avenues 
of research with regard to the limitations and potentials of these 
new governance arrangements and the requirements that their use 
imposes on public organizations, public servants and others involved. 
Many of our international contributors explicitly mentioned the need 
for more knowledge on hybrid governance and for research into its 
effect and conditions for success and failure. Building on the ideas 
set forth in the various chapters, but without the pretension of being 
complete, we suggest the following topics for future research into 
smart hybridity:
1. The possible and impossible combinations of various governance 
arrangements and the (toxic or magic) dynamics and added value 
these combinations bring about given the underlying mechanism 
and logics.
2. The specific next-step challenges and (moral) dilemmas that result 
from particular forms of hybrid governance and the strategies and 
coping mechanisms actors use to deal with them.
3. The further development of assessment models to evaluate the 
smartness of hybrid governance arrangements, more specially 
with attention to the use of information and (big) data, the plu-
rality of public values involved, representation, participation, 
 legitimacy, trust-building and accountability.
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4. A life cycle analyses of hybrid governance arrangements, includ-
ing their long-term effectiveness and sustainability and (condi-
tions of) their termination, continuation, adjustment, upscaling, 
and mainstreaming.
5. The possibilities and limitations of deliberately designing hybrid 
government arrangements, especially the potentials of designing 
hybrids as experiments and the implications thereof.
6. The resources, capacities and skills of actors to successfully 
 manage smart hybrid arrangements and deal with the (moral) 
dilemmas they encounter. This research might also address issues 
of supportive leadership, adaptive and learning capability and 
requirements for education and training.
7. The institutional conditions for the governance of smart hybrids, 
including the way public organizations are internally organized 
and managed to deal with hybrid arrangement. This research 
may also be aimed at making sectoral, regional and international 
comparisons to clarify how different contexts may impact on the 
evolvement and smartness of hybrid arrangements.
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